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Le test prénatal non invasif (TPNI) est une technique de dépistage prénatal qui ne présente pas 
de risque accru de fausse couche, peut être effectué plus tôt dans la grossesse et est plus précis que 
les technologies existantes. Cependant, ces avantages peuvent contribuer à l’érosion de 
l’autonomie reproductive. Entre 2013 et 2017, une étude intitulée PEGASE a été menée, validant 
les performances et l'utilité du TPNI, ainsi qu’analysant les implications économiques, éthiques, 
juridiques et sociales de la technologie. Le présent mémoire est basé sur les données d’une enquête 
auprès des professionnels de santé (N = 184). 
Ce mémoire aborde la relation entre les attitudes des professionnels de santé concernant a) le 
"consentement éclairé" et b) le "consentement écrit" dans le contexte du TPNI. Il remet en question 
le récit établi dans la littérature, que les professionnels qui croient que le consentement écrit pour 
le TPNI n'est pas important croient également que les procédures de consentement pour le TPNI 
«devraient devenir moins rigoureuses» (1). 
Les données montrent que ce sont les professionnels qui se soucient de l'autonomie qui doutent 
de l'importance du consentement écrit. Cela contredit le récit cité ci-dessus. Les opinions des 
professionnels sur le «consentement écrit» ne peuvent donc pas être utilisées pour inférer leurs 
opinions sur l’importance du «consentement éclairé». Il est recommandé d’enquêter les 
professionnels de la santé sur des considérations particulières liées à la pratique, telles que celles 
enquêtées dans cette étude, plutôt que d’interroger les répondants sur des concepts académiques 
tels le «consentement» ou l’«autonomie». 
 






Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT) is a new generation of prenatal screening that poses no 
increased risk of miscarriage, can be performed earlier in the pregnancy, and is more accurate than 
previously existing technologies. These advantages, however, potentially contribute to eroding 
reproductive autonomy, already under threat from other screening methods. Between 2013 and 
2017, a study titled PEGASUS was conducted, validating the performance and utility of NIPT, as 
well as studying the economic, ethical, legal and social implications of the technology. One of 
these activities was a series of surveys conducted throughout Canada in 2015-16. The present 
thesis is based on the data from the healthcare professionals’ survey (N=184). 
This thesis addresses the relationship between healthcare professionals’ beliefs regarding a) 
“informed consent” and b) “written consent” in the context of NIPT. It questions the established 
narrative in the bioethics literature, that professionals who believe written consent for NIPT is not 
important also believe consent procedures for NIPT “should become less rigorous” than those used 
for invasive prenatal testing (1). 
Data from the survey shows that it is precisely those professionals who care about reproductive 
autonomy considerations who doubt the importance of written consent for NIPT. This directly 
contradicts the narrative cited above. Professionals’ stated views on “written consent” thus cannot 
be used to infer their unstated views on the importance of “informed consent”. It is recommended 
to investigate particular practice-based considerations such as the ones in this study rather than 
querying survey respondents on scholarly concepts such as “consent” or “autonomy”. 
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Chapter One sets the background for posing the research question by going over the basics of 
prenatal screening, in general, and non-invasive prenatal testing, in particular, and the challenges 
these present to patient autonomy.  
Chapter Two explains the bioethics literature that lead to the formulation of the research question 
of this thesis:  
Is it possible to justify, given the Canadian data I have access to, the view that healthcare 
professionals’ stated disregard for written consent in the context of NIPT can be taken as 
indication of their belief that “consent procedures […] should become less rigorous” (Deans 
and Newson 2011)?  
Chapter Three discusses the study’s theoretical frame, laying out the concepts of consent and 
autonomy as they are used herein, including the possible interpretations of why, given the 
inadequacy of written consent to indicate informed consent, and the body of literature criticizing 
written consent, it is that we sometimes fall into the trap of conflating the two. This brief section 
makes use of anthropological and historical analyses of what written consent symbolizes and how 
it has come to be reformulated “from a matter of liability to a means of patient protection by way 
of guaranteeing ‘autonomy’ to individual patients” (2). 
Chapter Four presents the study methodology and results. 
Chapter Five, the discussion, opens by going over research participants’ stated reasons for 
believing written consent to be important or not in the context of NIPT. These remind us that there 
is no monolithic “Canadian healthcare provider viewpoint”, and that although many respondents 
confuse written and informed consent in their responses, many others differentiate between the 
two. We likewise see evidence that 1) some healthcare professionals’ requirements for informed 
consent are eroding, as well as 2) other healthcare professionals are calling for more rigorous 
measures for respecting informed consent. The discussion then turns to interpreting the results of 
the quantitative portion of the study, which suggest that healthcare professionals who claim that 
“written consent is not important for NIPT” are more likely to be those who demonstrate respect 
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for certain aspects of patients’ autonomy, clearly contradicting the narratives that conflate written 
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CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND 
PRENATAL SCREENING 
Prenatal screening refers to any technology that identifies pregnancies with a high probability 
of being affected with conditions such as chromosomal abnormalities (e.g. Down Syndrome (DS)) 
and neural tube defects. Prenatal screening differs from prenatal diagnosis (e.g. amniocentesis) in 
that screening only yields probabilistic results such as 1:100 or 1:10 000, and thus never completely 
rules out the possibility of the disease or condition being present. Diagnostic tests do provide a 
definitive positive or negative result. A diagnostic procedure is thus needed to confirm screening 
results before deciding on a further course of action (e.g., preparation for a child with possible 
special needs, prenatal intervention, or pregnancy termination) (3). Prenatal diagnostic techniques 
such as amniocentesis are not without risk, resulting in miscarriage in 0.5% of cases on average. 
Of the approximate 450 000 pregnancies annually in Canada, approximately 10 000 undergo 
amniocentesis, of which 315 are found to have a baby with DS and with 70 unaffected pregnancies 
lost from complications of the procedure (4). 
 
Longstanding Issues Raised by Prenatal Screening 
At its inception in the 60’s and 70’s, prenatal testing was presented as a means of preventing 
disease and “mental retardation” (5). It is only in the 90’s that the concept of reproductive 
autonomy became dominant in the discourse concerning prenatal screening. Following criticism 
from feminist and disability rights activists, the various professional bodies involved in providing 
prenatal screening services distanced themselves from accusations of eugenic practices by framing 
prenatal screening as a matter of personal choice regarding one’s life as opposed to a matter of 
public health (3, 5). 
Since then, autonomy and choice have been heralded as the main goals of prenatal screening 
(6), fitting into ‘free-market’ narratives that medical innovations are adopted as a result of 
sufficient demand by free and rational homo oeconomicus (7). This would mean that women of 
child-bearing age must have demonstrated sufficient interest for market forces to drive the 
development of relevant tests. However, in the case of prenatal screening, this scenario has been 
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questioned: “programs were initiated by government organizations, interested sectors of the 
medical profession, and the medical supply industry for their own purposes” (6, 8). This 
strengthens the argument that autonomy might be used as a fig leaf hiding different interests (3, 
9).  
Paradoxically, while being touted as enhancing choice, prenatal screening has, from its infancy, 
been criticized for undermining parents’ autonomy (10). Press and Browner claimed that when 
screening programs were first introduced by the government (in their case, in California), 
stakeholders had no interest in promoting reproductive autonomy via processes of informed 
consent. Stakeholders included the attending healthcare professionals who feared that if women 
reject screening they may face malpractice liability for “later claims of inadequate test 
explanation,” policy-makers whose interests were in increasing screening for economic and public 
health reasons, and expecting women who wanted access to available services but preferred to not 
engage in complicated deliberations that would involve the possibility of pregnancy termination. 
It is therefore important to contextualize the concept of “choice” that allegedly underlies prenatal 
screening within the broader social context, in order to effectively frame these choices (or lack 
thereof). Prenatal screening has thus been criticized for raising a slew of issues that ultimately 
inhibit reproductive autonomy, precisely the opposite of what it was lauded for (3). 
 
NIPT 
Non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) is a technology first introduced into clinical practice in 
2011 (11). The technology is based on the discovery that cell-free fetal DNA originating from the 
placenta and circulating in maternal blood can be tested to detect genetic conditions in the fetus as 
early as the 9th week of pregnancy. NIPT holds no risk of miscarriage and offers clinical benefits 
over existing prenatal screening tests such as maternal serum screening (MSS) by detecting the 
presence of trisomy 21 with high sensitivity and specificity (99.9% and 98% respectively) (12-14).  
By offering relatively easy and early detection of abnormalities, without risk to the fetus, NIPT 
provides important benefits for pregnant women and their families when compared to conventional 
screening and amniocentesis. The fact that results can be available earlier provides parents with 
more time to make decisions about the course of action and outcome of the pregnancy. Likewise, 
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NIPT’s improved accuracy reduces the number of false-positive and false-negative results thereby 
diminishing the drawbacks associated with traditional modes of screening. False-negative results 
can generate a false sense of reassurance, while false-positive results can provoke unnecessary 
anxiety and stress.  NIPT also reduces the need for invasive procedures since it has higher detection 
rates and lower false-positive rates compared to any previous prenatal screening tests. NIPT thus 
has the benefit of reducing the number of fetal losses associated with invasive tests. When it comes 
to a positive NIPT result, all professional societies currently recommend confirming the result with 
invasive diagnostic testing prior to making any decision regarding termination (15).  
The benefits NIPT may offer pregnant women are significant, and therefore, not offering or 
covering it may constitute an infringement on reproductive autonomy, just as limiting access to 
any reproductive technology may constitute an affront to reproductive autonomy. However, it is 
precisely these purported benefits of NIPT that ethicists warn may lead to an exacerbation of the 
ethical issues intrinsic to prenatal testing, particularly those related to reproductive autonomy. 
 
CHALLENGES NIPT POSES TO AUTONOMY 
The timing, reliability and safe nature of NIPT exacerbate concerns regarding the pressure 
placed on parents to screen and possibly terminate due to positive diagnostic results.  
First, NIPT can provide results earlier in the pregnancy than previous screening tests. This 
provides a crucial benefit to pregnant women and their families, as it allows earlier diagnostic 
testing and – in case of a positive diagnostic result – either more time to prepare for possible early 
therapeutic interventions or just to prepare for the birth of a child with special needs, or an earlier 
pregnancy termination. At the same time, the timing, reliability and safe nature of NIPT exacerbate 
concerns regarding the pressure placed on parents to screen and possibly terminate due to positive 
diagnostic results (3). Prior to the introduction of NIPT, parents could decline screening under the 
‘pretext’ of poor performance of conventional screens, the risk of miscarriage associated with 
invasive diagnostic testing and the fact that results are only available at an advanced stage of the 
pregnancy (approaching 20 weeks) even if they actually had other reasons for not screening (16). 
Such reasons could include a preference for a less medicalized pregnancy or an acceptance of the 
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possibility of having a disabled child, reasons which they might fear care providers, family 
members or society would not approve of (17). 
Second, the non-invasive (i.e. safe for the fetus) nature of NIPT, may lead to further 
undermining of informed consent and reproductive autonomy. Empirical studies have shown that 
some healthcare professionals believe NIPT warrants less formal informed consent procedures 
because it presents no increased risk of miscarriage (3, 18, 19). In addition, the common practice 
of same day pre-test counselling, directly followed by NIPT, further erodes informed consent 
because it eliminates the reflection period during which patients can discuss and decide whether 
to undergo screening (20).  
Third, the increased accuracy of NIPT results, as compared with previous screening techniques, 
changes the nature of the information the test yields. Whereas previous technologies provided a 
probability that the pregnancy is at high risk, NIPT now yields results (at least for trisomy 21) that 
may be perceived by parents as quasi-diagnostic. If consent is lacking or not fully informed, 
parents may receive results that they are unprepared for, or even do not wish to know(3). It may 
be argued that disclosure of an unwanted result from NIPT that is more reliable violates parents’ 
reproductive autonomy more extensively than the disclosure of more uncertain risk information 
(9).  
Prenatal screening is seen by many women as part of routine prenatal care (21, 22). Although 
NIPT has been rapidly implemented into publicly-funded screening pathways in some countries 
(e.g. the Netherlands, Belgium) (23-25), in most countries it is still offered only privately (11, 26) 
and is not yet considered standard of care, despite strong commercial interests that strive to make 
it a routine part of prenatal care (27, 28). NIPT offers great benefits and is thus a laudable, as well 
as ethically acceptable, step forward when it comes to enhancing women’s access to information 
they desire. At the same time, issues inherent in prenatal screening concerning reproductive 
autonomy have not yet been resolved and can now be exacerbated by NIPT(3). 
On the other hand, some may view the disclosure of more reliable results, even without 
appropriate consent, as less damaging than the disclosure of risk information. This is because risk 
information can create much anxiety for no reason (since with previous screening technologies 
most cases ended up being false positives), whereas NIPT results provide more certainty and 
significantly reduce the number of individuals unnecessarily exposed to anxiety and stress. This is 
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the rationale behind the recently proposed mechanism of ‘reflex testing’ (29), in which two blood 
samples are taken when women go through conventional serum screening. If a woman’s first-tier 
screen comes back as high-risk, her second blood sample is automatically sent for NIPT, and the 
woman is only informed of the NIPT result, without ever having been exposed to the less reliable 
result of the first-tier screen. The researchers who proposed this model argue that this eliminates 
the unnecessary anxiety suffered by all those for whom first-tier serum screening produces false-
positive high-risk results. However, there is no assurance of women being properly counseled and 
understanding the testing pathway they have unknowingly embarked upon. Thus, the advantage of 
reduced anxiety is achieved at the expense of informed consent and the woman’s right to choose 
(3, 30-32). 
In addition to feeling undue pressure when presented with the allegedly free choice of whether 
to screen, diagnose, and terminate, infringements on reproductive autonomy can occur when 
women do not sufficiently understand the implications of the test (3). Research has revealed that 
a significant number of women undergo screening without being aware that they were being tested 
(33, 34). Even if they are made aware that they are being screened and agree to it, many women 
report having received inadequate information about the conditions screened for, and what these 
conditions imply on a day-to-day basis, or having been led to believe that screening was mandatory 
or medically required (35-38). Such practices reflect the lack of time allowed for counseling: “As 
almost all results will be reassuring, professionals may also find it less important to inform women 
about the choices they may be faced with down the line of a further screening trajectory” (39).  
Disability rights scholars and activists claim that many people make prenatal screening 
decisions based on misconceptions about disability (27), therefore making uninformed choices, 
and that these misconceptions may be reinforced by health professionals who share them (40).  
Even if all relevant information regarding screening is made available and precautions to avoid 
any undue pressure are taken, the question regarding whether more information necessarily 
translates into greater autonomy remains. Evidence shows that prospective parents may experience 
bewilderment at the amount of information provided by prenatal screening (41). Information 
overload can be a cause of anxiety and stress and prospective parents may be left feeling perplexed 
when faced with the subsequent decisions they must make (3). It is important to note that this 
“burden of choice imposed on women” (20) is difficult because of the sensitive nature of the 
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information presented. This type of information can unnecessarily increase anxiety for the 
prospective parents (42), negatively affect the pregnancy experience and present parents with 
difficult reproductive choices – choices that they might not have had to face if they had forgone 
prenatal screening (39, 43).  
Additionally, this “bewilderment” applies not only to results provided by prenatal screening but 
also to information provided about prenatal screening at various stages of the process(3). Hence, 
while Press and Browner (10) pointed out that prospective parents prefer not to dwell on the social 
and ethical dimensions of prenatal screening, Kukla (44) suggested that parents often make a 
conscious choice to defer decisions to healthcare practitioners as a way of avoiding the burdens of 
information overload and decision-making regarding screening.  
While respecting autonomy necessarily requires doing so throughout the process of prenatal 
screening, the social contexts outlined above create barriers to achieving this goal (9). Seavilleklein 
(6) concluded in 2009 that “there is incontrovertible evidence that women are not making free 
informed choices about prenatal screening”, that “whether choice is interpreted narrowly as 
informed consent or broadly as relational, there are reasons to worry that women’s autonomy is 
not being protected or promoted by the routine offer of screening” and that “incorporating the offer 
of prenatal screening into routine prenatal care for all pregnant women is not supported by the 
value of autonomy and ought to be reconsidered.” These conclusions regarding prenatal screening 
were reached before the advent of NIPT. Ultimately, the introduction of any new prenatal 
screening technology into mainstream practice would require an attentive assessment of whether 
its implementation would contribute to or conversely undermine reproductive autonomy (3).  
Societal pressure to screen, to diagnose or to terminate a pregnancy in case of positive results 
negatively affect the possibility of exercising reproductive autonomy. These are three separate, but 
interconnected, pressures. It is argued that, given the nature of our “performance society” (45), 
prenatal screening for conditions perceived as disabilities is framed as the responsible choice. As 
such, pregnant women often feel obligated to screen for these conditions and accede to the 
“collective silence” that positive results should eventually lead to pregnancy termination (46).  
Many people, when faced with the decision of whether to pursue prenatal screening, may believe 
that it would be irresponsible to decline participation in a publicly funded program seemingly 
designed for the benefit of society as a whole. After all, the implementation of such tests by the 
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medical system “establishes screening as a legitimate use of scarce medical resources and thereby 
surreptitiously underlin[es] its importance” (3, 6).  
Pressures from the medical community also exacerbate the onus felt by parents to screen 
prenatally. There is evidence that medicine and preventive care are playing an increasing role in 
influencing decisions related to personal and social life. Great importance is placed on early 
detection and prevention of diseases and conditions, which has resulted in societal beliefs that 
people should participate in prevention programs and can be “morally blamed” if they fail to do 
so (47). Pregnancy, essentially a personal life event, has been affected by this social emphasis on 
disease prevention and is often perceived as requiring medical intervention and preventive care 
(3).  
Furthermore, clinicians are often criticized for being too directive when counselling patients 
regarding prenatal screening options (46). Logistical constraints, fears of malpractice and 
negligence litigation as well as clinicians’ own perceptions of the value of screening are all factors 
that can lead to clinicians – consciously or unconsciously – placing undue pressure on women to 
undergo prenatal screening. Likewise, when discussing possible future results of screening, high-
risk results are often framed in ways that do not allow much space for deciding not to continue on 
the testing pathway. When results become available, problems in communicating them clearly, 
transparently, meaningfully, and in a non-directive manner have been documented, with 
practitioners more often recommending screening, diagnosis and pregnancy termination (3, 41, 48, 
49). 
Lippman noted as early as 1986 that “implicit in the model is the acceptance […] that women 
whose fetuses are found to be affected will abort the pregnancy, since for most of the conditions 
for which screening can be done there is, at present, no treatment” in utero (50). Indeed, until 
today, the vast majority of pregnancies found to be affected with Down syndrome are terminated 
(51). The lack of social support for those raising children with special needs is thought to contribute 
to this sense of limited choice: “without extensive social support systems, termination may be the 
only viable reproductive option even when women or families may be willing or may desire to 
raise a child with special needs” (3, 26).  
Intimately related to the pressure to terminate are the so-called eugenics concerns, or what is 
often referred to as the “disability critique” of prenatal screening. The disability critique claims 
20 
 
that not only does the elimination of persons with certain conditions lead to further stigmatization 
of the condition, but that such practices may affect individuals already living with the condition. 
As such, if there is a decrease in the birth rate of individuals with a particular condition, the number 
of public resources and support services may also decrease (27). In attempting to enhance 
reproductive autonomy, it is important not to decrease the choices available to those who may 
want to pursue a pregnancy diagnosed with a disability or condition (3). 
 
Guidelines 
In 2013, the Genetics Committee of the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada 
(SOGC) recommended the test be an available option for pregnant women who have been 
identified as being at increased risk of fetal aneuploidies – through for example the results of MSS 
- of having an affected pregnancy (52). In 2014, the International Society for Prenatal Diagnosis 
(ISPD) considered the offer of NIPT as a first-tier screening test for all pregnant women to be an 
“appropriate” option (53). Of particular relevance to the present research:   
■ “All pregnant women in Canada, regardless of age, should be offered, through an informed 
counselling process, the option of a prenatal screening test for the most common fetal 
aneuploidies (II-A).” (15) 
■ “A discussion of the risks, benefits, and alternatives of the various prenatal diagnoses and 
screening options, including the option of no testing, should be undertaken with all patients 
prior to any prenatal screening. Women should have further discussion regarding local and 
provincial options available to them for prenatal genetic screening. Following this, they 
should be offered:  
 (1) no aneuploidy screening,  
 (2) standard prenatal screening based on locally offered paradigms,  
 (3) ultrasound guided-invasive testing, or  
 (4) maternal plasma cfDNA screening where available, with the understanding that it may 
not be provincially funded.” (15) 
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH QUESTION 
THE PROBLEM 
A study titled Will the introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing erode informed choices? 
An experimental study of health care professionals was published in 2010 in the journal Patient 
Education and Counseling (54). It reports the findings of a questionnaire administered to 231 UK 
health professionals “currently involved in the provision of prenatal testing”. The participants were 
presented with one of three vignettes where they “imagine working in an antenatal clinic at a point 
in time when all pregnant women are routinely offered prenatal testing for DS”, each of three 
vignettes referring to either: 1) invasive (and thus risky) prenatal diagnosis, 2) non-invasive 
prenatal screening using a blood draw (akin to NIPT), and 3) non-invasive diagnostic blood test 
(what the authors call NIPD – non-invasive prenatal diagnosis). The participants are asked “Do 
you think it is important for women undergoing this test to sign a consent form?”, with 4 choices 
of responses: from 1, definitely yes to 4, definitely not. No other question regarding written consent 
or informed consent is reported. Depending on which of the three types of test was described in 
the vignette, the way respondents answered the question on the importance of signing a consent 
form differed, with professionals believing signing a consent form to be less important for non-
invasive testing than for invasive testing. No attempt to link this result to what effect the non-
invasiveness of prenatal testing could have on informed consent is made in the paper; however, 
the title surprisingly includes “informed choices” rather than “written consent” or “signing a 
consent form”.  
This paper turned out to be highly influential in the field, being cited 110 times, according to 
google scholar. And, indeed, if we look at how the findings are interpreted in articles that cite this 
2010 study, the conflation of these two very different concepts of “written” and “informed 
consent” continues. In their 2010 article Non-invasive prenatal testing: ethical issues explored 
(55) (cited 145 times according to google scholar), de Jong et al. cite van den Heuvel et al. (54) as 
finding “that health care professionals seem inclined to the view that a less stringent standard of 
informed consent would suffice for NIPD testing”. In the 2011 Noninvasive prenatal diagnosis: 
pregnant women’s interest and expected uptake (37) (cited 127 times according to google scholar), 
Tischler et al. cite van den Heuvel et al. as evidence that “[b]ecause of the noninvasive nature and 
the lack of miscarriage risk, obstetricians may be less likely to approach the consent process as 
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rigorously for NIPD as they currently do for invasive diagnostic testing”. Others, such as Allyse 
et al.’s 2015 Non-invasive prenatal testing: a review of international implementation and 
challenges (11) (cited 147 times according to google scholar), do not conflate the two concepts, 
citing van den Heuvel et al. (54) as evidence that physicians “feel there is less need to obtain 
written consent for NIPT than for invasive testing”, which van den Heuvel’s study did, indeed, 
find. An article by 2 of the co-authors of the original 2010 paper demonstrates that the confusion 
between informed consent and signing a consent form was not limited to the catchy title or other 
authors’ overinterpretation of the findings, as Deans’ and Newson’s 2011 Should Non-
Invasiveness Change Informed Consent Procedures for Prenatal Diagnosis (1) abstract begins 
with “[e]mpirical evidence suggests that some health professionals believe consent procedures for 
the emerging technology of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis should become less rigorous than 
those currently used for invasive prenatal testing”. Believing that consent procedures “should 
become less rigorous” is a stretch from the original paper’s “practitioners will view the consent 
process for prenatal diagnostic testing differently”. 
While it may sometimes be obvious that informed consent is not reducible to signing a consent 
form, the narrative reducing it exactly in this way has been put forward and propagated 
significantly in very influential literature. While it is plausible that practitioners may, indeed, care 
less about informed consent for procedures that are not risky, that is not the only possible 
explanation. Another one, which is quite opposite, could be that due to the complexity of 
interpreting genetic test information, practitioners may increasingly believe that signing a consent 
form is not a sufficiently adequate manner of ensuring informed consent.  
The present research sets up a series of statistical hypothesis tests looking for evidence of 
practitioners who state in surveys that written consent is not important for NIPT being the same 
practitioners who believe informed consent should be less rigorous for NIPT. There are four 
possible outcomes of this survey: 
1. No correlations are found whatsoever (no null hypotheses are rejected), meaning we can 
assert nothing regarding the relation between what practitioners believe regarding informed 
consent and regarding signing consent forms; 
2. Evidence for the narrative suggested by van den Heuvel et al. (54) is found; 
3. Evidence refuting the narrative suggested by van den Heuvel et al. (54) is found; 
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Hypothesis 1 – Voluntariness 
It is possible for a patient to request to undergo NIPT. All else being equal, especially ensuring 
that the patient has access to the relevant information regarding the test, respect for such a request 
would constitute respect for the importance of a patient’s consent. Therefore, the relationship 
between claiming to be motivated by respecting one’s patient’s wishes to undergo screening and 
the rejection of the importance of written consent for NIPT is to be tested. 
H1.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the patient asking for the test. 
H1.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the patient asking for the test. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – Right not to know 
It is also possible for a patient not to want to know whether the fetus they carry has DS. A 
practitioner caring about informed consent would not offer NIPT to such a patient, regardless of 
whether they signed a consent form or not. 
H2.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by the patient not wanting to know whether the 
fetus has DS. 
H2.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by the patient not wanting to know whether the 
fetus has DS. 
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Hypothesis 3 – Early results 
As stated above, NIPT provides results earlier than other forms of screening. While having 
more time for making a decision does not obviously make the said decision more informed, it can 
be argued that those who would prefer to terminate a pregnancy with a fetus with DS could feel 
freer to do so if they found out about the DS earlier on in the pregnancy. Therefore, while having 
results earlier may not necessarily make the decision regarding testing more informed it does 
provide for more options regarding future pregnancy management. 
H3.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the fact that “NIPT would allow my patient to 
find out early in the pregnancy whether the fetus has DS or not”. 
H3.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the fact that “NIPT would allow my patient to 
find out early in the pregnancy whether the fetus has DS or not”. 
 
Hypothesis 4 – Evidence-base 
Whether or not a practitioner believes there is sufficient clinical data on NIPT has direct bearing 
on how informed the consent they can obtain from their patient can be. 
H4.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by insufficient clinical data on NIPT. 
H4.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by insufficient clinical data on NIPT. 
 
Hypotheses 5,6 – Economic considerations 
It is less obvious to see whether a patient being able to financially afford the test has bearing on 
whether they can meaningfully consent to it. Nevertheless, it was decided to include this series of 
hypotheses, based on 2 separate questions in the survey, among other things to test the consistency 
of survey responses, since this was the only issue queried twice, stated positively or negatively. 
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H5.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by the patient being unable to pay for the test. 
H5.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by the patient being unable to pay for the test. 
H6.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the cost of the test being covered. 
H6.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the cost of the test being covered. 
 
Group B: Societal Concerns 
Hypothesis 7 – Pressure to test 
It has been hypothesized that a routinization of offering NIPT can lead to women feeling 
pressure to undergo the test, whether they would otherwise want to or not. We queried practitioners 
as to their level of concern regarding routinization leading to such pressure to test. 
H7.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with level of 
concern over “increased pressure on women to use NIPT” “if NIPT were covered as part of routine 
prenatal care”. 
H7.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with level of 
concern over “increased pressure on women to use NIPT” “if NIPT were covered as part of routine 
prenatal care”. 
 
Hypothesis 8 – Pressure to terminate 
Similarly, it has been hypothesized that a routinization of NIPT can lead to more pressure felt 
by women to terminate a pregnancy with a fetus testing positively for DS. 
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H8.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with level of 
concern over “increased use of NIPT leading to increased pressure to terminate if the baby has 
DS” “if NIPT were covered as part of routine prenatal care”. 
H8.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with level of 
concern over “increased use of NIPT leading to increased pressure to terminate if the baby has 
DS” “if NIPT were covered as part of routine prenatal care”. 
 
Hypothesis 9 – Societal inclusivity 
If a person believes that most other people use NIPT and terminate pregnancies of fetuses with 
DS, it is logical for this person to believe that the society into which they plan to bring a child is 
not accepting of children with disabilities. Such a belief could influence a person not to carry a 
pregnancy with a fetus with DS to term, even if they would have liked to do so had society been 
more inclusive. 
H9.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with level of 
concern over “increased availability of NIPT making people less willing to accept children with 
disabilities” “if NIPT were covered as part of routine prenatal care”. 
H9.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with level of 
concern over “increased availability of NIPT making people less willing to accept children with 
disabilities” “if NIPT were covered as part of routine prenatal care”. 
 
Hypothesis 10 – Societal support 
Similarly to 9, if a person believes that most other people use NIPT and terminate pregnancies 
of fetuses with DS, it is logical for this person to believe that any resources currently earmarked 
for people with DS or their families could be dismantled. Such a belief could influence a person 
not to have a child with DS, unless they were certain that they had the resources to raise such a 
child without support from social institutions. 
27 
 
H10.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with level of 
concern over “reduction in resources available for people with DS and their families” “if NIPT 
were covered as part of routine prenatal care”. 
H10.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with level of 
concern over “reduction in resources available for people with DS and their families” “if NIPT 
were covered as part of routine prenatal care”. 
 
Hypothesis 11 – Discrimination 
Believing that society is increasingly discriminative of people with DS would inhibit a truly 
free choice regarding having a child with DS. 
H11.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with level of 
concern over “negative impact on individuals with DS and their families (stigma, discrimination)” 
“if NIPT were covered as part of routine prenatal care”. 
H11.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with level of 
concern over “negative impact on individuals with DS and their families (stigma, discrimination)” 
“if NIPT were covered as part of routine prenatal care”. 
 
Note on group B of hypotheses: 
Practitioners’ concern over the above five societal issues related to the routinization of NIPT is 
relevant to how they perceive the importance of informed consent, because being concerned with 
any of these societal issues (that affect the conditions under which patients are making their 
reproductive decisions) is indicative of practitioners’ awareness of the multifaceted nature of 
informed consent, beyond the mere signing of consent forms. 
 
Group C – Seeking alternative interpretations 
While it is possible that survey respondents who care about informed consent are less likely to 
perceive written consent as important, it is also possible that those who do perceive written consent 
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as important would be more likely to seek written consent for legal protection. As there were no 
questions in the survey directly related to legal liability, two other questions were chosen as 
proxies. The first had to do with professional recommendations and the second with the 
practitioner’s lack of comfort explaining the test.  
The reasoning was that if a practitioner claimed to be influenced by professional 
recommendations as to whether to offer the test, they may not be sufficiently informed on the 
technology and could be unreflexively following guidelines. If they were, themselves, not 
sufficiently informed, they could hardly provide the information necessary for the patient’s consent 
to be informed. Before such an interpretation is criticized for its naivety, I admit it myself. I am 
simply documenting my own (past and mistaken) reasoning for setting up the tests as they were. 
Nevertheless, I am glad to have had such mistaken and naïve reasoning, because it led me to set 
up this hypothesis (13), which adds important nuance to the research findings. 
Similarly, I believed that a practitioner who claimed not to be comfortable explaining the test 
would not (and could not) ensure informed consent, but would rather be interested in having a 
signed consent form in order to avoid legal liability. 
 
Hypothesis 12 – Deference to professional recommendations 
H12.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the test being recommended by professional 
organizations (SOGC, CCMG, ACMG). 
H12.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the test being recommended by professional 
organizations (SOGC, CCMG, ACMG). 
 
Hypothesis 13 – Practitioner’s discomfort 
H13.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by being uncomfortable explaining the test. 
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H13.A: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” DOES correlate with being 








CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAME 
CONSENT: INFORMED ET AL. 
There are two non-identical concepts used in the present research: consent (or informed 
consent) and written consent.  
 
(Informed) Consent 
According to Canadian legal guidelines (56, 57), “valid consent” requires: 
1) that it is voluntary, i.e., “free of any suggestion of duress or coercion”; 
2) that the patient has the capacity to consent, i.e.: 
a) be over the age of 14 years; 
b) demonstrate sufficient mental capacity to consent to medical interventions (the 
threshold of mental capacity is lower than for many other types of decisions); 
3) that the patient be “properly informed”. 
Satisfying the third condition is what confers the “informed” status on an act of consent. For it 
to be satisfied, the patient must be provided with “an adequate explanation about the nature of the 
proposed investigation or treatment and its anticipated outcome as well as the significant risks 
involved and alternatives available”. The information provided must be of such nature so as to 
allow for the decision taken by the patient to be considered “informed”. Furthermore, the 
guidelines state that the ultimate responsibility to ensure that consent is informed lies with the 
physician “who is to carry out the treatment or investigative procedure” (57). 
Whereas the Canadian Supreme Court has concluded that the scope of the duty of disclosure 
“must be decided in relation to the circumstances of each particular case” (57, 58), the notion of 
“reasonable person” can sometimes be invoked such as in the definition of what makes risk 
“material” and thus to be disclosed: "A risk is thus material when a reasonable person in what the 
physician knows or should know to be the patient's position would be likely to attach significance 
to the risk or cluster of risks in determining whether or not to undergo the proposed therapy." (59) 
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Providing necessary information is not sufficient for consent to be considered informed. The 
physician also has the duty to “take reasonable steps so as to be relatively satisfied that the patient 
does understand the information being provided” (57). 
Finally, valid consent must allow for its withdrawal at any time, by simple verbal notice (or 
otherwise in case of speech difficulties), thus introducing another condition for valid consent – 
that it be ongoing. It is especially important to ensure continuity of consent if there are any changes 
in the patient’s condition or the treatment/diagnostic offered that may make a difference to the 
patient’s decision. 
Guidelines also make it clear that consent can be implied or explicitly expressed by the patient. 
Expressed consent may be expressed orally or in writing. Obtaining expressed consent is suggested 
when in doubt over the patient’s decision.  
Furthermore, the ethical implications of medical consent depend on its context, whether it is 
sought in the context of care for a patient (including diagnostic interventions such as prenatal tests) 
or in the context of medical research, for example. The present study is only interested in the 
concept of informed consent to treatment (including diagnostics) and will thus ignore other 
instances of consent, such as that given to interventions performed in the context of research, where 
the person giving consent may not directly benefit from the intervention. 
 
Written consent 
Written consent is unambiguously not considered to constitute informed consent: “The 
explanation given by the physician, the dialogue between physician and patient about the proposed 
treatment, is the all important element of the consent process.” (57) While some Canadian 
jurisdictions legally require the completion of a written consent form before particular medical 
interventions may take place (e.g., all surgical procedures), “a signed consent form will be of 
relatively little value [in court] if […] the explanations were inadequate or, worse, were not given 
at all” (57). 
Of note is the empirical evidence demonstrating that having signed a written consent form is 
no guarantee that the patient has understood what they allegedly consented to (60, 61). In some 
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circumstances, in follow-up interviews, patients think that they selected the opposite of what their 
signed consent form indicates (62). 
 
Why is written consent mistaken for informed consent? 
It is worthwhile to turn to the history of the use of signatures in formal contexts when trying to 
answer the above question. Scholars of art history have claimed that signatures in European visual 
art have served three principal functions: “to claim presence and ‘presentness’ on behalf of the 
artist; secondly, to assert claims to ‘property’ and inheritance; and finally, to guarantee originality” 
(63). Arguably, the second function – of property and inheritance – applies less to medical consent 
forms (or other contexts where signatures are taken for granted, such as on identification cards or 
some forms of sales receipts, for example), as it is not obvious that something of value is claimed 
as a result of signing the consent form. Signing to claim “presentness” – “Yes, I was here and 
paying attention when this document was signed” – and originality – “It was, indeed, me who 
agreed to the procedure, and not someone else” – do apply. 
While classical painting provides a very visible example (pun not intended) of the use of 
signatures to represent value of some kind, it is obviously not the only example of the ritualization 
of signatures in modern European culture. Legal contracts and witnesses signing to attest to their 
witnessing are other obvious examples. Historians suggest that the use of the signature to attest to 
‘presentness’ and authenticity in the legal context emerged in the mid-nineteenth century in 
colonial North America, where people found themselves forming relationships with people from 
outside of their communities and were looking for ways of fixing identities and relationships where 
these were unusually (to their participants) unfixed (64). Similarly, when the relationship with the 
people who traditionally knew us best – our physicians – is unfixed, as it often is in modernity, 
medical consent forms provide this appearance of fixing “identities and certainty amid the fear of 
untethered relationships and the dubious morality of relationships produced through research” 
(65). 
There has also been work on the history of informed consent in the medical context, particularly 
that of Laura Stark (66). She argues that the dominance of the signed consent form in the US 
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beginning from the 1950s was due not to ethicists’ demands or arguments that signing consent 
forms would make the decision taken more informed and autonomous. She concludes that the 
rising dominance of signed consent was rather the result of NIH lawyers advising its use to protect 
the NIH in lawsuits brought by research participants. Hoeyer and Hogle claim that it was not until 
the late 1970s and the Belmont Report that signed consent procedures were “powerfully 
reformulated […] from a matter of liability to a means of patient protection by way of guaranteeing 
‘anonymity’ to individual patients” (2). Nevertheless, although the purpose of signing consent 
forms may have been “reformulated”, one may entertain the notion that if the reformulated purpose 
is subscribed to by the signatories, then maybe the ritual of signing consent forms has come to 
make actual informed consent “come into being” (65). Nevertheless, Ross reminds us that consent 
forms “do not inevitably produce and ensure ethical interactions. At best, they produce interactions 
that accord with a formalist understanding of relationship, as something that can be mediated and 
moderated by law” (67). A formalist legal understanding of signatures ascribes it three main 
functions: 
(1) “Finality function. The signature should make it clear that the signed document represents 
a completed declaration of will, and not just a draft which the signatory did not intend to be 
bound by.” 
(2) “Cautionary function. A signatory should be made aware that by his signature he is entering 
into a binding transaction.” 
(3) “Evidentiary function. A party should in case of dispute be able to use a signature for 
evidentiary purposes.” (68) 
The first two functions are incompatible with the principle of ongoing informed consent. The 
implications of agreeing to undergo prenatal screening are very different from those of, say, buying 
a house, or entering into a marriage. That a patient signs a consent form in no way suggests that 
the patient cannot change their mind and opt out of the procedure in question. We are thus left with 
only the third function, for potential use in case of dispute. 
One way in which signing a consent forms can attest to a form of willfully uninformed consent 
is when patients make a point of visibly not reading the consent form before signing it, as a way 
of showing how much trust they place in the researcher, on the one hand asserting their agency 
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while demonstrating that this agency is purposefully uninformed (69). This paradoxical way of 
seemingly asserting one’s autonomy does not, in fact, satisfy the SDT requirements of full 
autonomy. 
Wynn and Israel write that written consent forms “are types of rhetoric that use symbols of 
powerful institutions and cultural forms that evoke rationality and modernity in order to persuade 
that consent and ethical research practice have coalesced into a material format” thus elevating the 
consent form to “fetish1-like” status “symbolizing transparency and ethicality” even though they 
“neither document nor materialize ethical research relationships” (65). The reason that some ethics 
boards confuse written consent for informed consent is made more clear by Hoeyer and Hogle’s 
distinction between ‘politics of intent’ and ‘politics of practice’, where failure in practice to 
achieve informed consent by means of written consent only “seems to strengthen the political force 
of the intentions. The politics of intent operates in a moral domain: The stated intentions signal 
what ‘ought’ to be” (2). 
 
AUTONOMY  
The definition of autonomy used in the present research is that of Self-Determination Theory 
(SDT). Reproductive autonomy simply refers to autonomy in the context of decisions regarding 
one’s options of reproducing (or not). 
SDT defines a person as being autonomous when “his or her behavior is experienced as 
willingly enacted and when he or she fully endorses the actions in which he or she is engaged 
and/or the values expressed by them” (70). This definition of autonomy is thus constituted of two 
elements: 1) voluntariness of enacting the behavior, and 2) either endorsement of the actions or 
alignment of the values expressed by the actions with one’s personal values. Both of these elements 
are required in order for the behavior to be said to be autonomous.  
Ryan & Deci claim that for an act to be fully autonomous, it must be “endorsed by the whole 
self”, “fully identified with” and “owned” (71). Conversely, for an act to be considered less than 
fully autonomous, it would lack “full endorsement” by the person. Such less than full endorsement 
                                                          
1 “Fetishism invests near magical powers into things that do not actually possess them” (101). 
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could, for example, consist of an inner conflict over whether the act is wholly in line with our 
values, or in an active avoidance of reflection regarding the extent of alignment of values (71). 
Such a definition of autonomy goes further than the authors of the Belmont Report were willing 
to go when they claimed that “an autonomous person is an individual capable of deliberation about 
personal goals and of acting under the direction of such deliberation” (72). The SDT definition 
requires more than simple ability to deliberate about goals in such a manner; it actually requires 
for the values expressed by the act to align with one’s “core” values. However, it is interesting to 
note that the SDT definition does not contradict the Belmont definition, but rather refines it. 
The concept of reflective autonomy as defined by SDT is coherent with the philosophy of 
Cornelius Castoriadis, arguably the 20th century philosopher who focused most on autonomy. 
Castoriadis wrote that “autonomy comes from autos-nomos: (to give to) oneself one’s laws. […] 
it is hardly necessary to add: to make one’s own laws, knowing that one is doing so” as well as 
that autonomy “does not consist in acting according to a law discovered in an immutable Reason 
and given once and for all. It is the unlimited self-questioning about the law and its foundations as 
well as the capacity, in light of this interrogation, to make, to do and to institute (therefore also, to 
say)” (73). The SDT working definition of autonomy is thus coherent with Castoriadis’ thought 
on the subject. 
If we take the SDT definition to be complete, meaning that the autonomy of an act does not 
depend on anything more than the elements present in the definition, we arrive at the following 
corollary: Autonomy does not require an absence of external influences. All autonomy does require 
is that these external influences: 1) not violate the voluntariness of an act, and 2) not contradict the 
values that one is trying to express with the act. Interestingly, Ricoeur acknowledged as early as 
1966 that autonomy need not entail an absence of external influences, pressures, or mandates to 
act (74). We see, therefore, that autonomy is not equivalent to independence nor does autonomy 
require individualism or separateness in order to be applicable (75). SDT makes very clear that 
“the opposite of autonomy is not dependence but rather heteronomy, in which one’s actions are 
experienced as controlled by forces that are phenomenally alien to the self or that compel one to 
behave in specific ways regardless of one’s values or interests” (70). 
The requirement that the values expressed by an act align as much as possible with the patient’s 
own deeply held personal values means that even if she acts in a manner that completely agrees 
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with how her HCP is obviously trying to compel her to act in, such behavior is still autonomous if 
her values align with those of the HCP. In fact, Deci & Ryan recognize that “other people” could 
be an “important source of autonomy”, granted they behave in an “autonomy-supportive and 
noncontrolling manner” (76, 77).  
 
Figure 1. Autonomy Is Not Independence 
 
 
The distinction between reflective autonomy and reactive autonomy developed by Koestner and 
colleagues (78-80) helps us understand that autonomous decision-making does not require 
independence. While reflective autonomy is the autonomy defined within SDT, reactive autonomy 
is the “propensity to be resistant to external influences” (70), or what we sometimes call 
contrarianism. Within the confines of SDT, it is easy to see that resisting external influence may 
easily violate one’s autonomy, if that external influence went in the direction of one’s own values 
and interests to begin with. 
Another useful lesson from SDT regarding autonomy is that of the continuum of motivations 
(71, 81). The continuum ranges from full heteronomy to full autonomy, and passes through 
intermediate stages, thus getting rid of any possible binary dichotomy between autonomy and 
heteronomy and introducing a gradient. The most heteronomous forms of motivation are externally 
motivated, meaning that what motivates a person to act in a certain manner are external controls, 
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namely fear of external punishment or desire of external compensation. If one acts only in order 
to avoid to punishment or to reap the rewards, without considering how such acts align with our 
own values, one is clearly not acting autonomously as defined by SDT. Less heteronomous would 
be introjected motivation, which reflects “the partial assimilation of external controls”. In other 
words, one acts either in order to feel the approval of one’s actions by others, or to avoid being  
Figure 2. Gradient of Heteronomous Motivations 
 
judged for those acts, but where no external reward or punishment act as motivators. Further along 
the gradient are identified motivations that “reflect a personal valuing of the actions”. That is, my 
motivations are identified, if I act in a certain manner, because I believe, after deliberation, that 
this is the most morally correct course of action, even in the absence of other persons to witness 
my act, something Kant could probably get behind. Finally, Ryan & Deci define integrated 
motivations as those that are “both personally valued and well synthesized with the totality of one’s 
values and beliefs”, which is equivalent to satisfying the “full endorsement” criterion of autonomy. 
 
Why use the SDT definition of autonomy? 
In particular, using the SDT definition of autonomy allows us to see that the concept of informed 
consent can theoretically satisfy both criteria of autonomy, whereas written consent can only 
satisfy the voluntariness criterion and not the values (or “informed”) criterion. Furthermore, we 
also see that nondirective counseling does not necessarily ensure autonomous decision-making, 
while it does ensure reactive autonomy. 
In general, using the SDT view of reflective autonomy avoids the pitfalls that more widely used 
definitions of autonomy (82, 83) in the bioethics tradition are vulnerable to. Fagan defines the two 
key criteria for determining whether someone acts in an autonomous fashion as: 1) “whether the 
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patient possesses the cognitive capacity for autonomous deliberation” and 2) “whether the patient 
[is] free from undue external coercion or manipulation in [their] deliberations” (84), completely 
ignoring evaluating whether the action in question aligns with the agent’s values (criterion 2 in the 
SDT view). This classical definition in bioethics “assume[s] a strong view of individuality and 
agency”, where the individual is seen as “wholly and even necessarily self-sufficient, self-
determined, self-guided—in a word, atomistic—and who is entirely free to make his or her own 
choices independent from social inputs” (85). Such a strong foundation of autonomy in 
individuality can historically be traced to the Kantian atomistic concepts of “moral agent” and 
“good will” (86). “The ‘good’ will is purely autonomous, free from contingencies and inclinations” 
(87), while a moral agent is an individual capable of making rational decisions compatible with 
their rationally formed life plan, and who assumes responsibility for the consequences of their 
choices (88). 
While such an individualist account of autonomy is logically circumscribed within the tradition 
of classical Western philosophy, it has been criticized widely, being accused of “having no 
connection to the empirical world” (85, 87, 89-96). The atomism inherent in such a view of 
personhood and autonomy has been criticized on account of people’s sense of identity “occupying 
a place in an historical and social order of persons, each of whom has a personal history interwoven 
with the history of a community” (90), whereas individualist autonomy has been labeled as 
“noncontextual and based on an abstract concept that the individual is isolated and disconnected 
from the many relationships within which he or she actually exists” (95). Even one of the 
godfathers of North American bioethics, James F. Childress has warned that “the principle of 
respect for autonomy is ambiguous because it focuses on only one aspect of personhood, namely 
self-determination . . . we would have to stress that persons are embodied, social, historical, etc.” 
(91). Indeed, even within the parameters of Kantian moral agents establishing their values and 
interests within what a “good life” is for them, such considerations are necessarily impacted by the 
“situated and relational social determinants of the individual”, determinants that individualist 
autonomy fails to take into account (85). Furthermore, personal values “are not the hidden and 
privileged property of the individual [… but] take shape publicly” (93). As the relational view of 
a person is a “location in a web of relatedness to others” (96), instead of an atomistic moral agent, 
autonomy must also be seen as “both reciprocal and collaborative […] in that it is not solely an 
individual enterprise” (94). 
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Besides the situational and relational critiques of individualist autonomy outlined above, there 
is what can be called the cultural critique. Anthropological literature confirms to a certain extent 
the individualist aspect of North American culture, where “self-determination is regarded […] as 
freedom from group expectations, and self-reliance is regarded as a sign of strength” (92). 
Simultaneously, this somewhat caricatured vision of the Western concept of a person – “legalistic-
prototypically expressed in the language of rights, and central not only to our Declaration of 
Independence and Constitution, but to a very wide range of issues that find their way into our 
courts and our legislatures” (97) – is claimed to be “a minority viewpoint in the world” (84, 88). 
If this individualistic concept of personhood is alien to most humans on the planet, it is then 
claimed that “from the perspective of the world’s population, the North American emphasis on 
individualistic autonomy is an exception to the rule” (98). If this is so, we are told that the North 
American model of autonomy is “unsuitable in much of the remainder of the world where the 
concept of “person” differs substantially from that of Western societies” (88). While the present 
research is carried out in North America, it purports to be applicable throughout the human world, 
and so problematic individualistic notions of autonomy are rejected in favour of reflective notions 
of autonomy, as offered by SDT. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE STUDY 
METHODOLOGY 
The present research uses mixed methods survey methodology (i.e., quantitative and 
qualitative) to empirically answer the research question. The empirical data informs normative 
reflection regarding reproductive autonomy and consent. The reason mixed methods is appropriate 
for such a study is to avoid the pitfalls of utilizing exclusively quantitative methods (such as, e.g., 
the studies this thesis criticizes) as well as to avoid the perceived ambiguity of exclusively 
qualitative methods. Whereas qualitative research can be criticized for being ungeneralizable (99) 
or insufficiently objective (100), quantitative research risks being wrongly interpreted (101). Even 
when the original quantitative research may be interpreted adequately and meaningfully, there may 
be room for subsequent misinterpretation by the audience; examples thereof constitute the starting 
point for the present analysis. Mixed methods can, therefore, facilitate “understanding complex 
phenomena because it allows readers to understand and explain” (102). 
 
Data Collection and Ethics Approval 
The questions used in the present study are a sub-set of the questions asked of healthcare 
professionals in a questionnaire administered as part of a larger research project titled PEGASUS 
[http://pegasus-pegase.ca/fr]. The questionnaire was developed by 3 researchers (Laberge, 
Ravitsky, Leclerc-Blain, the first 2 being PIs on the project), based on a review of the relevant 
literature (20), clinical experience of 2 of the researchers (Laberge and Leclerc-Blain), and 
questionnaires used in previous studies (47, 54, 103-109). The questionnaire was reviewed by 6 
researchers: Légaré, Ehman, Rousseau, Wilson, Haidar, Chitty for content validity and feasibility. 
The questionnaire was then piloted on 4 health professionals (1 ob/gyn, 2 genetic counselors and 
2 medical genetics resident) and 1 clinical research coordinator from a university medical center 
(CHU Ste. Justine). The final questionnaire consisted of 28 questions, as well as additional socio-
demographic questions. Question formats included Likert scales, ‘true or false’ statements, 
multiple choice, and ranking. The full questionnaire is included as appendix 2. It was available as 
both a paper copy distributed to potential participants as well as an online version on limesurvey’s 
platform. The survey ran from March 2015 to July 2016. 
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The survey’s target audience consisted of Canadian professionals falling into either of the 
following 7 categories, and self-selecting as interacting regularly with pregnant women: 
1. General practitioner 
2. Pediatrician 
3. Ob/Gyn 
4. Clinical Geneticist 
5. Genetic Counselor 
6. Nurse 
7. Midwife 
Health professionals were recruited at 6 sites (the Newfoundland Health Science Center 
General Hospital as well as the 5 sites participating in PEGASUS: Ste. Justine, CRCHU de 
Québec, Ottawa Hospital Research Institute, BC Children’s Hospital, U of Calgary), 7 academic 
conferences in 2015, via mailing lists of 10 Canadian professional societies who sent their 
members an email with a link to the survey, as well as by using the snowball technique asking the 
researchers associated with the study to send the questionnaire link to their personal networks. 
Ethics approval was obtained from the CHU Sainte-Justine associated with the University of 
Montreal (#3781) as well as locally from the CRCHU de Québec, the Ottawa Hospital Research 
Institute, BC Children’s Hospital, the University of Calgary, and the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Health Research Ethics Authority. No particular risks associated with participating in the study 
were anticipated. By completing and submitting the completed questionnaire, respondents 
confirmed their consent to participate, as the questionnaire’s cover page made explicit. 
 
Data Analysis 
All data were stored and analyzed using IBM SPSS 24. Statistical analysis consisted of Mann-
Whitney U (hypotheses 1-6, 12-13) and Kruskal-Wallis (hypotheses 7-11) tests. Given that 
multiple statistical tests were carried out, the threshold of statistical significance (i.e., necessary to 
reject a null hypothesis) was selected a priori as p<0.01. 
The alternate hypothesis always consists of two distinct possibilities: positive and negative 
correlation. The present study is driven by the aim to find statistical evidence for the claim that 
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HCPs believe written consent to not be important for NIPT due to their disdain for patients’ 
reproductive autonomy. However, if evidence for the contrary claim arises, it shall be dealt with 
as well, the contrary claim here being that those HCPs who believe written consent to not be 
important for NIPT are precisely those who care more about patients’ reproductive autonomy, or 
more specifically, a particular aspect of this autonomy as dealt with by each hypothesis. 
 
Limitations 
As with all surveys, we must consider the potential limitation regarding whether the study results 
can be taken as representative of the total population targeted, i.e., Canadian healthcare 
professionals routinely seeing prenatal patients. While the sample size of 184 may be able to reflect 
the considerable heterogeneity of Canadian HCPs treating pregnant women, a potential self-
selection bias cannot be ruled out, where HCPs with more knowledge of or interest in NIPT may 
have participated more readily in the survey. The breakdown by main field of practice is not 
surprising with genetic counselors and ob/gyns dominating the respondent sample. Similarly, the 
geographic distribution of the sample was determined by the fact that the PEGASUS study ran in 
5 hospitals in 4 provinces (BC, AB, ON, QC), although a few professionals from other provinces 
participated as well, due to there being additional recruitment strategies. Nevertheless, the 4 
provinces mentioned above are Canada’s most populous, and there is little reason to believe that 
any cultural heterogeneity among Canadian HCPs was overlooked due to geographic distribution. 
Another limitation that applies to surveys in general is that responses to hypothetical questions on 
surveys do not necessarily predict what decisions the respondent would actually make in an 
identical real-life situation. Nevertheless, besides lengthy ethnographic observation, other 
methodological choices where practitioners are queried regarding their practices would have been 
similarly limited by participants’ potentially inaccurate perception, memory, and generalization of 
their practices. 
Importantly, it bears noting that HCPs’ practices and preferences can be differently affected by 
relevant policies and contexts that vary between provinces and territories. In particular, at the time 
of the survey, only Ontario’s insurance covered the cost of NIPT for high-risk pregnancies. 
Although, based on the study data, no conclusions were drawn concerning the relationship between 
attitudes towards written consent and the influence economic considerations had on professionals’ 
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decisions to offer NIPT or not, it cannot be ruled out that HCPs’ other motivations were not 




A total of 184 HCPs completed the survey. Their demographic characteristics are summarized in 
the following table. 
Table 1. Participant Characteristics 
Characteristic % of Health 
Professionals n = 184 
Age  




Main field of practice  
Genetic counselor 29.3 
Obstetrician Gynecologist 28.8 
Clinical geneticist 9.8 
Nurse 6.5 
Midwife 5.4 
General Practitioner 3.8 
Other 16.4 
Years of practice  
Mean (SD) 12.4 (9.5) 






Atlantic Provinces 3.8 
Territories (Nunavut/NWT/Yukon) 0.5 
Practice environment  
Public hospital 50.0 
Research hospital 20.7 
Private practice 15.2 
Public health organization 5.4 
Other 8.7 
Years of experience in prenatal setting  
Mean (SD) 10.6 (9.3) 
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Approx. # of prenatal patients seen in prenatal setting per week  
Mean (SD) 28 (76) 
Approx. % of patients at ‘high risk’ for Down syndrome  
Mean (SD) 26.7 (28.3) 
Experience in prenatal diagnosis for Down syndrome 87.5 
Currently offering NIPT 73.6 
Down syndrome screening currently offering  
Integrated prenatal screening (IPS) 62.7 
NIPT 55.1 
First trimester screening 38.9 
Quad screening 30.8 
Serum IPS 30.8 













The following tables provide an overview of how study participants responded to the questions 
analysed. Percentages do not include non-responses. 
 
Table 2. Healthcare Professionals’ Attitude towards Written Consent for NIPT 
 Yes No I’m not sure 
“Do you think it is important to get written 
consent for NIPT” 
 
81 (44.0%) 69 (37.5%) 34 (18.5%) 
 
Table 3. Reasons to Offer NIPT to a Patient 
“Which of the following reasons would influence your 
decision to offer NIPT to a specific patient?” 
Yes Unchecked 
“The test is recommended by professional organizations 
(SOGC, CCMG, ACMG)” 
106 (58.2%) 76 (41.8%) 
“My patient asks for the test” 92 (50.5%) 90 (49.5%) 
“NIPT would allow my patient to find out early in the 
pregnancy whether the fetus has DS or not” 
113 (62.1%) 69 (37.9%) 
“If the cost of the test were covered” 92 (50.5%) 90 (49.5%) 
N does not add up to 184 as 2 participants did not answer this question 
 
Table 4. Reasons not to Offer NIPT to a Patient 
“What following reasons would make you not offer NIPT 
to a specific patient?” 
Yes Unchecked 
“My patient does not want to know whether the fetus has 
Down syndrome (DS)” 
153 (85.5%) 26 (14.5%) 
“There is insufficient clinical data on NIPT” 17 (9.5%) 162 (90.5%) 
“I am not comfortable explaining the test” 6 (3.4%) 173 (94.0%) 
“My patient would have to pay for the test” 39 (21.8%) 140 (78.2%) 









Table 5. Healthcare Professionals’ Level of Concern Regarding Societal Concerns Related to NIPT 
“Provincial health care 
systems cover routine 
prenatal care. Right now, 
NIPT is not part of routine 
prenatal care in most 
provinces and territories. 
If NIPT were covered as 
part of routine prenatal 
care, which of the 
following outcomes would 











“Increased pressure on 





47 (25.7%) 28 
(15.3%) 
13 (7.1%) 1 
“Increased use of NIPT 
leading to increased 
pressure to terminate if the 











“Increased availability of 
NIPT making people less 






41 (22.4%) 25 
(13.7%) 
18 (9.8%) 1 
“Reduction in resources 
available for people with 










“Negative impact on 
individuals with DS and 












Participants’ qualitative responses to the optional sub-question “Why?” explaining their 
multiple choice response to the question “Do you think it is important to get written consent for 




Given that there was a third choice (“I’m not sure”), two sets of results are reported for 
completeness sake (for other combinations of comparisons, please contact the author): 
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1. those comparing No to Yes;  
2. those comparing (No AND I’m not sure) to Yes (presented in table format only) 
although only the first one will be the focus of the discussion. 
Tables 3 and 4 present these results, respectively. 
 
Concerns related to ‘individual’ autonomy 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the patient asking for the test. 
p=0.004 – we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis 
Pearson correlation value=-0.234  
 
Accepting the alternate hypothesis in this case, together with the fact that the correlation is 
negative, means that HCPs who are influenced to offer NIPT by the patient asking for the test (i.e., 
those who claim to be motivated by respect for the patient’s choices) are more likely to believe 
written consent to be unimportant for NIPT.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by the patient not wanting to know whether the 
fetus has DS. 
p=0.571 
No conclusion can be drawn; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the fact that “NIPT would allow my patient to 
find out early in the pregnancy whether the fetus has DS or not”. 
p<0.001 – we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis 




Accepting the alternate hypothesis in this case, together with the fact that the correlation is 
negative, means that HCPs who claim to care about giving their patients more time to make 
decisions relevant to pregnancy management and related to information given by NIPT are more 
likely to believe written consent to be unimportant for NIPT.  
 
Hypothesis 4 
H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by insufficient clinical data on NIPT. 
p=0.047  
No conclusion can be drawn; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
Note: interestingly, surprisingly few respondents said they would be motivated by such a 
hypothetical, perhaps not understanding the hypothetical nature of the question. 
 
Hypothesis 5 
H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by the patient being unable to pay for the test. 
p=0.668 
No conclusion can be drawn; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 6 
H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the cost of the test being covered.  
p=0.321  











H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with level of 
concern over “increased pressure on women to use NIPT” “if NIPT were covered as part of routine 
prenatal care”.  
p=0.141  




H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with level of 
concern over “increased use of NIPT leading to increased pressure to terminate if the baby has 
DS” “if NIPT were covered as part of routine prenatal care”.  
p=0.283  




H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with level of 
concern over “increased availability of NIPT making people less willing to accept children with 
disabilities” “if NIPT were covered as part of routine prenatal care”.  
p=0.094  




H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with level of 
concern over “reduction in resources available for people with DS and their families” “if NIPT 




No conclusion can be drawn; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis 11 
H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with level of 
concern over “negative impact on individuals with DS and their families (stigma, discrimination)” 
“if NIPT were covered as part of routine prenatal care”.  
p=0.020  
No conclusion can be drawn; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
Seeking alternative interpretations 
Hypothesis 12 
H0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to offer NIPT to a specific patient by the test being recommended by professional 
organizations (SOGC, CCMG, ACMG). 
p=0.009 – we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis 
Pearson correlation value=-0.214  
Accepting the alternate hypothesis in this case, together with the fact that the correlation is 
negative, means that HCPs influenced by professional guidelines are more likely to believe written 




H14.0: Believing “it is important to get written consent for NIPT” does NOT correlate with being 
influenced to NOT offer NIPT to a specific patient by being uncomfortable explaining the test.  
p=0.545  










Table 6. Results of Hypothesis Testing comparing “No” to “Yes” (disregarding the “not sure”s) 
Hypothesis Tested p Correlation strength 
Hypothesis 1 (voluntariness)  0.004 -0.234 
Hypothesis 2 (right not to know) 0.571 0.047 
Hypothesis 3 (early results) <0.001 -0.295 
Hypothesis 4 (evidence-base) 0.047 0.163 
Hypothesis 5 (unable to pay) 0.668 -0.036 
Hypothesis 6 (cost is covered) 0.321 -0.082 
Societal concerns   
Hypothesis 7 (pressure to test) 0.141 0.121 
Hypothesis 8 (pressure to terminate) 0.283 0.088 
Hypothesis 9 (societal inclusivity) 0.094 0.137 
Hypothesis 10 (societal support) 0.052 0.159 
Hypothesis 11 (discrimination) 0.020 0.190 
Alternative Interpretations   
Hypothesis 12 (professional recommendations) 0.009 -0.214 
Hypothesis 13 (practitioner’s discomfort) 0.545 -0.050 
 
Table 7. Results of Hypothesis Testing comparing (“No” OR “not sure”) to “Yes” 
Hypothesis Tested p Correlation strength 
Hypothesis 1 (voluntariness)  0.038 -0.154 
Hypothesis 2 (right not to know) 0.531 0.047 
Hypothesis 3 (early results) 0.030 -0.161 
Hypothesis 4 (evidence-base) 0.073 0.134 
Hypothesis 5 (unable to pay) 0.661 -0.033 
Hypothesis 6 (cost is covered) 0.383 -0.065 
Societal concerns   
Hypothesis 7 (pressure to test) 0.117 0.116 
Hypothesis 8 (pressure to terminate) 0.232 0.089 
Hypothesis 9 (societal inclusivity) 0.220 0.091 
Hypothesis 10 (societal support) 0.125 0.114 
Hypothesis 11 (discrimination) 0.049 0.146 
Alternative Interpretations   
Hypothesis 12 (professional recommendations) 0.006 -0.203 







SUMMARIZED INTERPRETATION OF SALIENT FINDINGS 
In summary, three null hypotheses are rejected. However, instead of constituting evidence for the 
narrative that believing written consent to be unimportant in the context of NIPT coincides with a 
disregard for patients’ reproductive autonomy, the three alternative hypotheses adopted attest to 
the contrary narrative, that is, believing written consent to be unimportant in the context of NIPT 
coincides with: 
1. Being influenced to offer NIPT by the patient asking for the test; 
2. Being influenced to offer NIPT by the fact that NIPT allows the patient to find out early in 
the pregnancy whether the fetus has DS; and 







CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
Before drawing conclusions from statistical tests, the qualitative and quantitative data is 
discussed, in this order. 
We examine the different justifications study participants give for valuing “written consent”. I 
place it in quotation marks here, because those were the words in the questionnaire that participants 
were reacting to. 
 
Written consent does improve informed consent 
One set of justifications explicitly states that written consent does lead to informed consent: 
- “The exercise of a written consent may improve the information being given by the health 
professional.” 
- “Reading the consent for patients reinforces benefits and limitations of tests” 
One healthcare provider, although stating that “while I think written consent improves care 
provider adherence to information shared”, did not consider this to be sufficient justification for 
requiring written consent, as they did “not think that written consent should be required for the 
sting [blood test] to be done. It is far more important to improve the process for transmission of 
information to the patient.” 
Others’ justification falls between this set (“written does improve informed”) and the 
“materializing consent” set discussed below: “To ensure mothers realize they can opt out”). 
 
For the benefit of HCP 
A few study participants claimed that the reason written consent is important is because it 
provides some sort of benefit to healthcare providers, either the attending one or others: 
- “I think it's helpful for the practitioner to know they covered certain information with the 
patient. But by the same token, patients are usually emotionally overwhelmed and 
receiving so much information, one could argue the consent is somewhat meaningless” 
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- “I think it is important to document that certain information was discussed with the 
patient.” 
- “To allow all caregivers to be aware pt [patient] has received the information for this test.” 
 
Materializing consent via the ritual of signing 
Some justify the importance of written consent by simply stating that “patient needs to sign”. 
Others explain in a bit more detail why they ascribe such importance to signing: 
- “If we do not formalize the consent process, NIPT will become just another routine test 
that patients undergo simply because it is offered; they will think their doctors recommend 
the test.” 
- “To ensure mothers realize they can opt out” 
 
Written is assumed to refer to informed 
By far, the largest set of justifications for the importance of written consent assumed that 
“written consent” in the question actually meant “informed consent”, and answered accordingly 
(e.g., “So patients are informed and agree that they understand the test and the purpose of it.” or 
making the confusion even more apparent: “I feel that informed consent is very important in the 
process.”) 
One respondent’s justification could be classified among this group, but they also provide their 




A quite popular justification for the importance of written consent (as well as for its 
unimportance, as we shall see below) is to protect the practitioner against legal liability in the 
future, e.g.: 
- “As a written proof of acknowledging all consequences.” 
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- “To show that consent obtained” 
One respondent, while not referencing “legal protection” per se, specified that it was particularly 
the risk of incidental findings that made written consent required: “May get info they don't want”. 
 
Just ‘cause 
Finally, there are two kinds of justifications that I group as the “just ‘cause” reasons. The first 
of these states that written consent for NIPT is required, because written consent for other types of 
tests (“FTS”, “HIV, prenatal labs, MSS, IPS”) is required. Interestingly, one participant believed 
that written consent for NIPT is important, even though they did not consider it to be currently 
required by practitioners for other screening tests: “I similarly would like to see the same consent 
for all genetic screening in pregnancy though”. 
The second of the two kinds is the “genetic exceptionalism” justification, i.e., we must get 
written consent, because NIPT “is a genetic test” (author’s translation of French response). 
 
And now, we go on to examine the different justifications study participants give for not 
valuing “written consent”. 
Cumbersome 
At least two practitioners said that written consent is unimportant, because it is “cumbersome”: 
- “If we have to get written consent for every test, it becomes cumbersome.  I think consent 
is important, but we already have too many written forms.” 
- “Written consents are a hurdle and there is implicit consent when someone gets care and 
attend to a blood draw for the screening test.” 
 
Implicit 
As the latter comment attests to, the cumbersome argument can overlap with the argument that 
consent is implicit, so why ask to document it: 
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- “Consent is implied by performing the test, ensuring that adequate counselling was 
provided prior” 
- “for some blood tests, allowing your blood to be drawn is consent enough.  I am not sure 
when more express consent should be obtained.” 
- “Implied consent by giving blood sample.” 
 
No risk, not diagnostic 
I group these two sets of justifications together: 
1) “because no associated risks e.g. miscarriage or fetal death...” or “Non invasive test” 
And 
2) “It is not diagnostic” 
This, in my opinion, is precisely the argument that some scholars assume healthcare providers 
have in mind when they state that written consent is unimportant. We note that it is therefore not 
such an implausible leap from “healthcare professionals believe written consent is unimportant for 
NIPT” to “NIPT’s lack of risk and it not being diagnostic will cause healthcare professionals to 
care less about informed consent”. Nevertheless, we also note that it was a justification provided 
by very few healthcare professionals participating in this study. While a quantitative approach to 
the qualitative justifications is inappropriate, just this time, I make an exception and count the 
comments. Only 5/86 fall in this category. 
 
Just ‘cause 
Interestingly, the status quo justification (what I term “just ‘cause”) was provided against 
requiring written consent, as well, in fact, considerably more often than as an argument for 
requiring written consent, e.g., “I feel that if you do not need written consent for IPS you should 
not need it for NIPT”. One participant reversed this argument somewhat, writing “If written 
consent to be required, should be required for any prenatal screening.”, which can be interpreted 
in a number of ways.  
59 
 
It is interesting to note that this reasoning is provided on IRBs’ official websites, e.g., “Signed 
informed consent is the standard expectation in research with human participants” 
(https://www.irb.cornell.edu/faq/#con2). 
 
Written is not informed 
Finally, the most common type of justification either for or against the importance of written 
consent was that written does not mean informed, and that what is important is that consent be 
informed, whether written or verbal. 
 
The take-away message from the above discussion is that there are healthcare professionals who 
(1) believe that due to the nature of NIPT as compared to other screening technologies, informed 
consent procedures ought to be relaxed, thus eroding the principle of informed consent; as well as 
others who (2) believe informed consent to be of utmost importance, regardless of whether they 
believe written consent should be a required part of informed consent procedures or not. 
In order to demonstrate that the latter group (i.e., those who care about informed consent but 
not written consent) is not marginal, we now turn to the quantitative results. 
 
The three null hypotheses that were rejected give us insight into what motivates those healthcare 
professionals who answered that written consent was unimportant for NIPT to offer the tests to 
their patients. They are motivated to offer the test by: 
- NIPT being able to provide results much earlier to their patient; 
- their patient asking for the test; and 
- by it being recommended by professional organizations. 
It bears noting that the p chosen as the threshold was 0.01, and that a less conservative approach, 
with a p=0.1, for example would have caused the rejection of 4 more null hypotheses, all 
explaining the motivations to offer the test for those professionals who did respond that written 
consent was important for NIPT. In other words, what the analysis of quantitative results suggests 
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is not necessarily that all those who believe written consent to be unimportant are those who are 
motivated by concerns for their patients’ autonomy. What it does suggest is that an important 
subgroup of them are, thus piercing through the narrative that claiming written consent to be 
unimportant is an indication of disregard for patient autonomy. With this important caveat 
mentioned, we can turn to analyzing each hypothesis separately. 
 
Concerns correlating negatively with perceived importance of written consent 
1. Canadian healthcare professionals who believe written consent to be unimportant for NIPT 
claim to be motivated to offer NIPT to their patients by the fact that NIPT provides results earlier 
in the pregnancy than other screening technologies. There are at least two reasons for caring about 
the earlier availability of results: it allows more time for decision-making, and it could allow for 
more options in decision-making if the patient considers termination as an option, since it may be 
easier to terminate a pregnancy with a fetus with an aneuploidy if the aneuploidy is discovered 
earlier, for social, emotional, moral and even medical reasons. Neither reason for caring about 
early result availability is consistent with an erosion of the principle of informed consent. We thus 
conclude that the alternative hypothesis adopted is one indication that perceiving written consent 
for NIPT to be unimportant does not coincide with eroding attitudes towards the principle of 
informed consent. If anything, the quantitative evidence here suggests the opposite, a narrative 
termed in the section above as ‘written is not informed’, which states that what is important is that 
consent be truly informed, regardless of whether it is documented by signing consent forms or not. 
2. It is also the case that Canadian healthcare professionals who believe written consent to be 
unimportant for NIPT claim to be motivated to offer NIPT to their patients by their patients asking 
for the test. Rejecting the null hypothesis in this case (p<0.004) is the most obvious evidence for 
rejecting the narrative that perceived unimportance of written consent for NIPT is an indication of 
eroding attitudes towards informed consent procedures. Those healthcare professionals who 
specify that they are motivated by their patients’ own stated wishes are the same ones who reject 
the importance of written consent for NIPT. 
3. Finally, the third motivation correlating with stated unimportance of written consent is being 
motivated by professional recommendations. This particular finding can be interpreted in a variety 
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of ways. One interpretation is that healthcare professionals can believe that if professional 
recommendations recommend the test, why should it then matter what each individual patient 
thinks, explaining disregard for both informed and written consent. It is also possible that a subset 
of those who are influenced by guidelines and who believe written consent to be unimportant see 
written consent as mostly serving a legally protective role, and thus as a less necessary measure of 
protection, given that professional guidelines recommend the test, providing legal protection 
perceived as sufficient by some HCPs. Another interpretation is more consistent with the above 
two findings, i.e., that those motivated by professional recommendations are equally motivated by 
all aspects of these recommendations, one of which is the recommendation to seek informed 
consent (or informed request), and not just written consent. 
 
Concerns almost correlating positively with perceived importance of written consent 
1. The professionals who claim to be more concerned by potential discrimination of individuals 
living with conditions screened for by NIPT if such screening became part of routine prenatal care 
are also the professionals who answer that written consent is important for NIPT, albeit p=0.02, 
i.e., greater than the 1% selected as the threshold of statistical significance. (The following 
correlations are even less statistically significant.) In this case, it could mean that the professionals 
who take societal consequences of individual technology adoption into consideration are also those 
who believe informed consent needs to be enforced rigorously, and either believe written consent 
to be integral to informed consent or conflate the two notions when responding to the question. It 
could also mean that professionals holding such arguably pessimistic views of society, namely that 
routine use of NIPT to screen for certain conditions will lead to increased stigmatization and 
discriminations of individuals living with that condition, are also more prone to fear of litigation 
and thus require signed consent forms as protection against such litigation. Other interpretations 
of this result could no doubt be imagined, but these two examples above suggest the wide range 
that these interpretations can have. 
2. Similarly, professionals more concerned with the routinization of NIPT leading to an erosion of 
social support for individuals living with DS and their families also perceive written consent for 
NIPT as important. Again, many interpretations can be imagined, but the one that seems most 
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plausible is that these are the professionals who are concerned with the unintended social 
consequences of liberal eugenics public health programmes, are also those who care about 
patients’ reproductive autonomy, fear their patients’ reproductive autonomy to be at risk from such 
unintended social consequences, and thus particularly see the importance of cultivating truly 
informed consent for undergoing screening among all their patients. In other words, they may 
believe that even patients who might believe that they want to exercise their atomistic reproductive 
autonomy by undergoing screening, once provided with all relevant perspectives, including the 
one that their exercising their own autonomy may disproportionately prevent others from doing 
the same, may reconsider. Such a reconsideration could constitute for some of these professionals 
a genuine exercise of reflexive autonomy. They then go on to answer that “written consent” is 
important, because this is the only question on the importance of consent they are given, and 
because they care too much about informed consent to quibble about whether written consent is a 
good proxy for informed consent. 
3. Another almost correlation from this series is that of being more concerned with society 
becoming less inclusive of people with disabilities as a result of NIPT routinization and stating 
that written consent for NIPT is important. The same arguments made above apply here as well. 
4. Finally, a different consideration almost correlated with stating the importance of written 
consent: that of being influenced to not offer the test by insufficient clinical data. First of all, less 
than 10% of professionals claimed to be motivated in such a way, much fewer than for any of the 
other criteria reported on above. This means that, due to the small N (17 HCPs motivated thus), 
the p=0.047 ought to be taken with an even greater grain of salt. Nevertheless, this finding could 
warrant future research to see to what extent being influenced by the clinical validity and utility of 
the test when offering screening to patients has any bearing on how professionals approach 







Concerns uncorrelated with perceived importance of written consent 
Finally, we are left with the 6 hypotheses yielding p’s of over 10%, not allowing us to even 
approximately conclude anything. 
1. Being motivated by the patient not wanting to know about fetal aneuploidies correlates in no 
way with the perceived importance or unimportance of written consent for NIPT. This could be 
interpreted in the sense that both those professionals who care about consent, informed or written, 
and those who do not will similarly not offer NIPT to those patients who have already stated their 
preference not to know. 
 
2. Being motivated by economic considerations (whether the patient can afford the test and 
whether the test is covered by insurance) in the decision to offer NIPT to a patient also does not 
correlate with the perceived importance of written consent. One possible interpretation of this 
finding is that economic considerations, like that of not wanting to know the status of the fetus, for 
those who are conscious of being motivated by them, are considerations that override others (if 
my patient cannot pay for the test and it is not covered by insurance, what is the point of offering 
it?) and are not affected by the professional’s perceived importance of consent. 
 
3. Being more concerned with routinization of NIPT leading to increased pressures on women to 
screen and to terminate pregnancies with DS also does not correlate with stated perceived 
importance of written consent. These two concerns over NIPT routinization differ from the three 
above in that these are potential pressures on all pregnant women faced with the decision to screen 
or the decision over the management of a pregnancy with a fetus with DS, whereas the other three 
were broader societal concerns affecting only those choosing to carry such a pregnancy to term. In 
other words, the social concerns subject to hypotheses 9-11 can lead to a narrowing of options 
(even if only psychologically) for all pregnancies (an individual might inherently appreciate 
raising a child with DS, but social discrimination may prevent them from going forward with doing 
so, a decision that would not be fully autonomous by the definition of autonomy adopted in this 
thesis, as explained in Chapter 2). On the other hand, pressures to test or terminate work on 
different levels of the gradient of heteronomous motivations, more heteronomous than being 
motivated by social conditions, and thus have a different relationship with truly informed consent 
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(or according to the numbers in this study, lack such a relationship). Re-phrasing the interpretation 
further, it could be the case that HCPs perceive pressure to test and terminate as less threatening 
to exercising one’s reproductive autonomy than the less obvious societal considerations of 
discrimination and lack of support, and thus those who are concerned by such pressures do not 
have the same hope that rigorous consent procedures can mitigate them. Conversely, it is possible 
that the nature of these pressures, being completely dependent on the patient-HCP relationship, 
means that if a professional can exert pressure on their patient to screen or to terminate a 
pregnancy, they surely can exert the pressure necessary to sign a consent form. 
 
4. Finally, another finding whose interpretation cannot ignore the low N of the sub-group (N=6) is 
that we can predict nothing about the professional’s perceived importance of written consent from 
the fact that they claim to be motivated not to offer NIPT because they are “not comfortable 




Since the 1990s, the concept of reproductive autonomy became dominant in the discourse 
advocating the implementation of prenatal screening into public health programmes. Nevertheless, 
for just as long, doubts have been voiced regarding whether, in practice, prenatal screening is 
actually implemented in ways that respect and promote women’s reproductive autonomy. The 
advantages that NIPT brings to the table as compared with previously implemented screening 
technologies, namely the increased accuracy (resulting in a marked decrease of risky 
amniocentesis procedures) and earlier availability of results, are precisely the characteristics that 
lead to NIPT potentially exacerbating the issues related to reproductive autonomy. Besides the 
increased pressure that women may feel to test and possibly terminate that is due to the nature of 
the technology itself, the worry has been raised that healthcare professionals may additionally take 
informed consent procedures less seriously due to the NIPT’s more precise and risk-free nature. 
The present thesis takes as its point of departure a 2010 article Will the introduction of non-
invasive prenatal testing erode informed choices? An experimental study of health care 
professionals, whose title suggests that an erosion of informed consent procedures was tested 
empirically among health care professionals. Upon careful scrutiny of the article, it turns out that 
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the title makes reference to results of a question posed to health care professionals regarding their 
views on the importance of signing a consent form. While the leap from perceiving written consent 
to be unimportant in a certain context to disregarding informed consent altogether seems somewhat 
intuitive, it is far from obvious. 
The Canadian study conducted under the auspices of the PEGASUS project from 2015 to 2016 
(whose data analysis was performed by the author of this thesis) also attempted to gauge healthcare 
professionals’ attitudes toward consent. It also only posed a question on written consent, and was 
also originally interpreted by this author in the same way as the authors of the 2010 
abovementioned article. However, since respondents to the Canadian study were given the 
opportunity to qualitatively explain their responses, upon analysis of these responses, it quickly 
became clear that interpreting the perceived unimportance of written consent for NIPT in such a 
way was too simplistic. 
Quantitative analyses of the data yielded the correlation that Canadian healthcare professionals 
who responded that written consent was not important were much more likely to report that they 
are motivated to offer NIPT to their patients by the patient asking for the test, by the test results 
being available earlier in the pregnancy and by the fact that NIPT is recommended by professional 
organizations. The first two correlations suggest that considering written consent to be unimportant 
coincides rather with a certain respect for the patient’s autonomy and for informed consent. The 
third correlation is more difficult to interpret. Two of the explanations offered herein were that 
being influenced by professional recommendations was an indication of overall attention to 
clinical validity and utility considerations or alternatively of a rather legalistic approach to consent, 
where written consent is mainly seen as protection against potential legal liability, and the test 
being recommended by professional organizations seen to negate the need for such protection. 
Overall, the conclusion drawn from the hypothesis test results is that we ought to be skeptical 
regarding the claim that seeing written consent as important coincides with high standards of 
informed consent. In other words, the van den Heuvel et al. study (54) should not have used the 
words “informed consent” in their title and should have reported only on “written consent” making 
the distinction between these two explicit. Deans and Newson’s follow-up paper (1) was wrong to 
claim that the 2010 study constituted “empirical evidence suggest[ing] that some health 
professionals believe consent procedures for the emerging technology of non-invasive prenatal 
diagnosis should become less rigorous than those currently used for invasive prenatal testing”. To 
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be fair, I agree that “some health professionals” do believe that, if the sample is large enough. 
Nevertheless, there is absolutely no empirical evidence to suggest that there is a widespread 
increasing disregard for informed consent among healthcare professionals in the context of NIPT, 
due to NIPT involving less risk to the fetus. On the contrary, the present thesis has demonstrated 
that, at least in the Canadian 2015-2016 context, the converse is true: healthcare professionals, as 
a whole, care considerably about informed consent in the context of NIPT and are thus bringing 
social scientists’ attention to the fact that written consent is in their opinion inadequate as a 
sufficient means to ensure informed consent. 
The implications for future research from the findings herein are twofold. First of all, and more 
specifically, it is recommended that questions be formulated around concrete practices whose use 
or lack thereof is easily witnessed and/or around values motivating decision-making, as some of 
the questions in the survey on which the present thesis is based did. Scholarly concepts such as 
“consent” are too charged to query in a quantitative survey and ought to be left to more in-depth 
qualitative research. It is very difficult, without being able to ask tailored follow-up questions, to 
ascertain precisely what a health practitioner refers to when speaking of “consent”. The survey the 
present thesis is based on did attempt to query respondents regarding “written consent”, and the 
respondents rightly pointed out the inadequacy of the question in that format. Granted, out of the 
seemingly contradictory responses arose the research question for this thesis, but it was a mistake 
not worth repeating in future surveys. Avoiding such mistakes in the future would help improve 
the reliability of research findings regarding the critically important issue of consent for NIPT, for 
prenatal testing in general, and beyond – in the practice of medicine. 
Second of all, and more generally, this study’s results serve as a reminder to researchers relying 
on quantitative social science data to be more conscientious and critical of the interpretations made 
and how such interpretations are communicated in the literature. It is, indeed, difficult not to draw 
facile conclusions if they corroborate the preconceived notions the researchers may have. 
Nevertheless, it is precisely when we receive results that seem to corroborate our hypotheses that 
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Appendix 1. Questionnaire Used in the Study 
 
SURVEY FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
 
 
Please read the following instructions before completing the questionnaire: 
 
STUDY DESCRIPTION 
NIPT (Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing) is a new technology used in high-risk pregnancies for detecting Down syndrome and other 
conditions. We are trying to learn what health professionals know about NIPT and what their perceptions and attitudes are regarding its 
clinical implementation and use. This questionnaire is part of a larger study on NIPT, called PEGASUS, see: http://pegasus-pegase.ca/.  
 
CONSENT 
By completing and returning this questionnaire, you consent to participate in this part of the PEGASUS study and authorize Dr. Vardit 




This questionnaire is anonymous. All information obtained in connection with this questionnaire will be kept confidential.  Access to this 
questionnaire will be restricted to the members of the research team, for the duration of the study. The questionnaires will be kept in a 
secure place, under lock and key, for a maximum of 10 years after the project ends. The results of the study may be published, but no 




For further information regarding this project, you are welcome at any time to contact Dr. Vardit Ravitsky at (514) 343-6111 extension 




Please answer directly on the questionnaire.  When you are finished, please seal it in the attached envelope and hand it in or 
return it in the pre-addressed envelope. 
 
If you prefer to complete this questionnaire online, you can find it at:   
http://nipt.hostedincanadasurveys.ca/index.php/658186/ 
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1. Do you think these statements are true or false?  
(PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT) 
 
True False  
a. NIPT is currently accepted as a diagnostic test for Down syndrome (DS)    
b. 
Professional guidelines (e.g. SOGC) recommend that NIPT be offered to 
all pregnant women   
 
c. 
It is currently recommended to confirm a positive result of NIPT with 
invasive testing 
   
d. NIPT has a detection rate of almost 100% for DS in high risk pregnancies    
e. 
NIPT can estimate the risk for neural tube defects, like current maternal 
serum screening 
   
f. NIPT can be used for sex determination    





2. How comfortable are you in describing the following information about Down syndrome (DS) and NIPT to patients? 
(PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT) 
 









Clinical description of DS (phenotype, variability, 
prognosis) 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. 
Accuracy and limits of NIPT (false-positives, false-
negatives, range of conditions tested) 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. 
Patient’s personal risk assessment (according to family 
history, age, previous pregnancy history) 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Options available if NIPT comes back positive for DS 1 2 3 4 5 




The following sections contain information on NIPT. Please do not change your previous answers based on 
the information provided in the next sections. Since this is a new test, we want to know what professionals 
know about NIPT before answering the survey.  
Thank you! 
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PART 2:  FEATURES OF NIPT  
 
NONINVASIVE PRENATAL TESTING (NIPT) can detect if a pregnancy is at a higher risk for Down syndrome (DS) and requires only a 
blood draw from the pregnant woman as early as 10 weeks gestation. There is no risk of miscarriage and it can predict with over 99% 
accuracy if the fetus has DS. However, it is not a diagnostic test at this time and amniocentesis should be done for confirmation. NIPT 
can detect higher risk of trisomy 13 and 18, but with less accuracy. It can also confirm sex, but not whether the baby has neural tube 
defects. Please see a comparative table of current tests (appendix). 
 
3. How important would the following reasons be in your decision to offer NIPT (in general, not to a specific patient)? 
(PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT) 






a. Absence of miscarriage risk 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Better accuracy than current screening 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Ease of use 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Recommendation of professional guidelines 1 2 3 4 5 






4. When offering NIPT for DS, how important do you think it is to discuss the following information with your patient?  











Clinical description of DS (phenotype, variability, 
prognosis) 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. 
Accuracy and limits of NIPT (false-positives, false-
negatives, range of conditions tested) 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. 
Patient’s personal risk assessment (according to family 
history, age, previous pregnancy history) 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Options available if NIPT comes back positive for DS 1 2 3 4 5 






5. When do you feel is the best time to discuss with your patients the following features of NIPT? 
(PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT)  
  First prenatal 
appointment 
ahead of 
time of NIPT 





a. Clinical description of DS (phenotype, variability, prognosis)    
b. 
Accuracy and limits of NIPT (false-positives, false-negatives, 
range of conditions tested)    
c. 
Patient’s personal risk assessment (according to family 
history, age, previous pregnancy history) 
   
d. Options available if NIPT comes back positive for DS    
e. Resources available for families of children with DS    
 
Other: 
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6. Do you think it is important to get written consent for NIPT?  
 (PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER ONLY) 
 












7. There are different ways that NIPT can be used. Which one do you think is currently the most appropriate approach? 
(PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER) 
 
 
Current screening using ultrasound and/or MSS, followed by NIPT as a second-tier screening (confirmed with 
amniocentesis) 
 NIPT as first-tier screening (replacing MSS), confirmed with amniocentesis 
 
NIPT as a diagnostic test (without confirmation by amniocentesis), then availability of pregnancy termination if NIPT 








8. What following reasons would make you not offer NIPT to a specific patient?  
(PLEASE CHECK ALL THAT APPLY) 
 
 My patient does not want to know whether the fetus has Down syndrome (DS) 
 There is insufficient clinical data on NIPT 
 I am not comfortable explaining the test 
 My patient and/or her partner have no family history of DS 
 My patient would have to pay for the test 




9. Which of the following reasons would influence your decision to offer NIPT to a specific patient?   
(PLEASE CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)  
 
 The test is recommended by professional organizations (SOGC, CCMG, ACMG) 
 My patient asks for the test 
 My patient is at a higher risk of having a child with DS 
 My patient or her partner has a family history of DS 
 NIPT would allow my patient to find out early in the pregnancy whether the fetus has DS or not 
 If the cost of the test were covered 
 Other: _________________________________________________ 
  




10. NIPT currently costs about 500-800$ in some private clinics. Who do you think should have access to NIPT free of charge? 
(PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER ONLY) 
 
 All women  Low risk women only  Other: ___________________ 





11. To what degree do you believe that the following features are barriers to clinical implementation of NIPT? 











a. Lack of coverage for the test (generally not reimbursed)   
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Lack of knowledge by health professionals 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Lack of interest by the government 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Lack of interest by pregnant women and their partners 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. Lack of resources (qualified lab personal, qualified labs) 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Lack of clinical validation studies 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Lack of equal access to the test 




12. What would be the best way to inform health professionals about NIPT? 
(PLEASE RANK: 1= YOUR FIRST CHOICE, 5/6 = YOUR LAST CHOICE) 
 
 Professional guidelines 
 Staff meetings 
 Conferences 
 Journal clubs 
 Ground rounds 
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 Other: ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
PART 4:  SOCIAL IMPACT OF NIPT  
 
13. If NIPT became part of routine tests offered during pregnancy and covered by the healthcare system, do you 
think women would feel pressure to take it? 






 A lot of 
pressure 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. Provincial health care systems cover routine prenatal care.  Right now, NIPT is not part of routine prenatal 
care in most provinces and territories. If NIPT were covered as part of routine prenatal care, which of the 
following outcomes would be of concern to you? 
(PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT) 






a. Increased pressure on women to use NIPT 1 2 3 4 5 
b. 
Increased use of NIPT leading to increased pressure to 
terminate if the baby has Down syndrome (DS) 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. 
Increased availability of NIPT making people less 
willing to accept children with disabilities 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Decrease of the population of people with DS 1 2 3 4 5 
e. 
Reduction in resources available for people with DS 
and their families 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. 
Negative impact on individuals with DS and their 
families (stigma, discrimination) 






PART 5:  FUTURE USES OF NIPT  
 
15. In the future, NIPT may become a very reliable predictor of many genetic conditions. Are you in favour of 
NIPT being available for the following conditions: 
(PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT) 





 In favour 
a. 
Inherited disorders (Tay-Sachs, cystic fibrosis, 
sickle cell disease, Gaucher disease) 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Paternity testing 1 2 3 4 5 
c. 
Physical and behavioural attributes  
(eye colour, intelligence, sexual orientation) 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. 
Predisposition to childhood-onset diseases  
(autism, leukemia) 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. 
Predisposition to late-onset diseases  
(heart conditions, Alzheimer’s disease, cancer) 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. 
Predisposition to mental disorders  
(schizophrenia, bipolar disease) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 






16. Technology today allows us to look for other chromosomal anomalies, including microdeletions and 
microduplications, using chromosomal microarrays or comparative genomic hybridization.  How useful do you 
think it would be to perform such tests through NIPT in low-risk women?  
(PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER) 
 
Not useful  
Somewhat 
useful 
 Very useful 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
PART 6: ABOUT YOURSELF    
 
17. Your age: _______________ 
 
18. Your gender: ______________ 
 
19. What is your field of practice? 
(PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER) 
 
  General Practitioner   Obstetrician/Gynecologist   Genetic Counselor    Midwife 
  Pediatrician    Clinical geneticist    Nurse   Other: 
_______________________ 
 
20. Years of practice: _______________________ 
 
21. In which province or territory are you currently practicing?  
(PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER) 
 
  Alberta   New Brunswick   Northwest Territories   Ontario   Saskatchewan  
  British Columbia   Newfoundland and Labrador   Nunavik   Prince-Edward-
Island 
  Yukon 
  Manitoba   Nova Scotia   Nunavut   Quebec  
 
22. What is your main field of practice? 
(PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER) 
 
  Private practice   Public hospital   Other: __________________ 
  Research hospital   Public health organization  
 
23. Number of years of experience you have working in a prenatal setting: _________________ 
 
24. Approximate number of prenatal patients seen in a prenatal setting per week: _________________ 
 
25. Approximate percentage of your patients who are ‘high-risk’ for Down syndrome: _______________  
 
26. Do you have experience in prenatal diagnosis for Down syndrome?       Yes    No 
 
27. Do you currently offer NIPT?    Yes   No  
 
27.1. If yes – to whom? (check all that apply)  
 
  All pregnant women 
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  Women with pregnancies at high risk for Down syndrome after screening 
  Women with pregnancies at high risk for aneuploidies based on ultrasound findings 
  Other: ___________________________________________________________ 
28. What type of Down syndrome screening do you currently offer to your patients? 
(PLEASE CHECK ALL THAT APPLY) 
 
 
  First trimester screening  
(NT, free β-hCG, PAPP-A, MA) 
  Triple screening  
(AFP, uE3, total hCG, MA) 
  Quad screening  
(AFP, uE3, free β-hCG, inhibin A, MA) 
  NIPT  
  Integrated prenatal screening (IPS)  
 (NT, PAPP-A, AFP, uE3, free β-hCG/total   
 hCG, inhibin A, MA) 
  Other: 
_____________________________ 
  Serum IPS  
(PAPP-A, AFP, uE3, free β-hCG/total  




Thank you for completing this survey. 












Appendix 2. Qualitative Results (unsorted) 
English Language Responses: 
- it's the informed consent process which is more important than their signature 
- Verbal consent is fine 
- Making this question mandatory for the following reasons is not kosher!! This question is 
very poorly worded or the options are poorly worded as one option is missing.  It is 
important to get consent, but consent doesn't always have to be written. 
- To ensure that individuals understand issues re: "screen" vs. "test". -Discussion re: What 
results possible - implications of these. -Discussion re: patient understands they cab "opt 
out" of testing etc. 
- May get info they don't want 
- If written consent is obtained for FTS, it should be obtained for NIPT 
- make sure the patient understands the limitations of the testing 
- We don't get written consent for any other genetic test or prenatal screen 
- Still an advanced screen. IPS is a screen and no woman in consented 
- We do not get written consent routinely for screening or other genetic tests 
- As a written proof of acknowledging all consequences. 
- For medicolegal protection 
- It is a blood test with no risk of complication 
- Do we assume consent - when pt agrees to test? 
- To allow all caregivers to be aware pt has received the information for this test. 
- patient needs to understand the test & more importantly agree to have it done 
- I feel that if you do not need written consent for IPS you should not need it for NIPT 
- Minimal risk to mother - must understand risk of blood collection 
- Informed consent 
- because no associated risks e.g. miscarriage or fetal death... 
- Non invasive test. Oral explanation should be enough. 
- like any other screening test. HIV, prenatal labs, MSS, IPS etc 
- patient needs to sign 




- We don't currently get written consent for MSS/IPS 
- To make sure the patient understands the benefits and limitations, that a +ve result needs 
to be confirmed by an invasive procedure, and that it is NOT diagnostic 
- Informed consent process is more important than written documentation of consent which 
does not necessarily equal true informed consent. Pt. consent SHOULD be documented 
but it doesn't need to be by a signed consent form it could be chart note 
- Verbal consent is OK provided they have had an informed discussion 
- I feel that the main reason to get written consent is to protect against lawsuits and so only 
if you were concerned about lawsuits would that be important. I think the 'active ingredient' 
with informed consent is the discussion, not the signature & documentation. 
- So patient can testify that she was fully informed about the benefits, risks, etc of testing 
- Verbal consent is sufficient 
- To make sure patients understand implications 
- To ensure patient understands purpose/limitations of test 
- We don't get written consent for most parts of clinical care, including ultrasounds, IPS etc. 
- Verbal consent should be enough 
- I document in the chart 
- Verbal consent if documented should be adequate. 
- we don't get written consent for other prenatal screens, so why should NIPT be different? 
The patient should be verbally consenting and physically consenting by having the blood 
draw. 
- It is important for women to understand the limitations and the potential follow-up testing 
that can come from NIPT tests. eg., if a woman is determined not to have invasive testing 
yet she wants a diagnostic test and screening tests, then a full discussion needs 
- If we do not formalize the consent process, NIPT will become just another routine test that 
patients undergo simply because it is offered; they will think their doctors recommend the 
test. 
- Written consents are a hurdle and there is implicit consent when someone gets care and 
attend to a blood draw for the screening test.  I think as long as medical summary of visit 




- The exercise of a written consent may improve the information being given by the health 
professional. 
- I think it's helpful for the practitioner to know they covered certain information with the 
patient. But by the same token, patients are usually emotionally overwhelmed and 
receiving so much information, one could argue the consent is somewhat meaningless 
- While i think written consent improves care provider adherence to information shared, i do 
not think that written consent should be required for the sting to be done. It is far more 
important to improve the process for transmission of information to the patient. 
- So patients are informed and agree that they understand the test and the purpose of it. 
- Don't for other blood tests including prenatal screening etc. 
- Consent is implied by performing the test, ensuring that adequate counselling was provided 
prior 
- Everything test should be only done with the woman's informed consent.  It is a very 
personal decision and we are not the ones to decide what is in the best interest of the family; 
the couple is. 
- NIPT is not a diagnostic test, but is very close to it. Therefore, I feel that informed consent 
is very important in the process. 
- I think it is important to document that certain information was discussed with the patient.  
In particular that a positive NIPT result does not mean there is a 99% chance that the baby 
has DS 
- 1) READING THE CONSENT FOR PATIENTS REINFORCES BENEFITS AND 
LIMITATION OF TESTS 2) medicolegal liability issue 
- We don't get written consent for IPS so I don't really think you need written consent for 
NIPT, but I do think it's preferable to get consent. 
- for some blood tests, allowing your blood to be drawn is consent enough.  I am not sure 
when more express consent should be obtained. 
- industry-led marketing is manufacturing anxiety among pregnant women and 
misunderstanding of the limitations of NIPS. 
- Implied consent by giving blood sample. If written consent to be required, should be 




- I don't think having written consent is a good way to ensure appropriate counseling/patient 
understanding 
- Patient should always be informed on implications of any testing 
- Verbal consent for screening test is adequate as per IPS 
- Test is not perfect an it is often not well explained to patients. Ethical concerns in screen 
in for trisomy 21. 
- It is not diagnostic 
- not necessary 
- To ensure mothers realize they can opt out, because the test may cause unnecessary anxiety 
and lead to further investigations. 
- I think documented informed choice and consent is needed, but written consent not needed.  
NIPT rates and risks are even better than current IPS which do not require written consent 
- due to the challenges with what to do with both positive and negative result - I similarly 
would like to see the same consent for all genetic screening in pregnancy though 
- If we have to get written consent for every test, it becomes cumbersome.  I think consent 
is important, but we already have too many written forms.  We need to work better on our 
communication for screening tests in general (including the detailed ultrasound at 
- To show that consent obtained + document certain things discussed with them 
- Providing the relevant and complete information about NIPT so the client can make an 
informed decision is more imp than having her sign a piece of paper. 




- Parce que le test est très sensible (presque diagnostique) et qu'un résultat positif aura un 
impact significatif pour la patiente 
- Pour s'assurer que le test n'est pas prescrit à l'insu des parents; afin que ce soit basé sur un 
choix éclairé. 
- Pour que les patientes aient pris le temps d'y réfléchir, pour qu'elles aient conscience que 




- D'une part, en signant un consentement les patientes prendraient plus conscience de 
l'engagement qu'elles font en utilisant le TPNI. Elles comprendraient qu'elles s'engagent à 
connaître des informations qui peuvent changer le cours de leur vie d'un côté comme 
- Pour s'assurer que la patiente fait un choix libre et éclairé et que les avantages et 
inconvénients du test ont bien été compris. 
- Trouvailles/mosaïques/ compréhension des limites et acceptation du test 
- Parce qu'il s'agit d'une garantie pour le patient ET pour le professionnel de la santé. Ca 
permet de systématiser et uniformiser les limites d'un test, et de les officialiser. 
- S'assurer que la patiente ait reçu toutes les informations et donne un consentement éclairé 
- fait par dépistage sérique [illegible] 
- Compréhension et preuve légale. Concentration patient. 
- Comprendre les limites (FP,FN,VPP,VPN) et les tests invasifs si toni +- 
- Pour indiquer et confirmer que le couple comprend bien le test et qu'ils ont réfléchi à leur 
décision. Pour un test comme celui, un consentement éclairé est primordial. 
- Au Québec, même pour le dépistage sérique/intégré, la signature du formulaire de 
consentement est obligatoire. Ça donne au moins une indication sur le fait que la patiente 
aurait reçu un minimum d'information" 
- En raison des trouvailles fortuites qui pourraient être faites lors de la réalisation du test, 
comme cancer... 
- Dans le cas où c'est bien balisé, un note médicale claire à l'effet que la patiente est informée 
et accepte le test suivie d'un prélèvement sanguin qui supporte la notion de consentement 
aussi devrait être acceptable.  Tant mieux si on a en plus de ça un 
- Le consentement écrit n'est pas requis pour le programme québécois de dépistage de la 
T21. Cependant, il pourrait être utile de faire signer un consentement pour le TPNI de façon 
à uniformiser les infos transmises à la patiente. 
- C'est un test génétique, donc toutes les tests génétiques ont besoin d'un consentement clair 
et écrit 
- Consentement oral suffisant selon moi à condition que les +/- du NIPT soient expliqués 
aux patients. 
 
